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Abstract
We provide a general model of dynamic competition in an oligopolistic industry with
investment, entry, and exit. To ensure that there exists a computationally tractable
Markov perfect equilibrium, we introduce firm heterogeneity in the form of randomly
drawn, privately known scrap values and setup costs into the model. Our game of
incomplete information always has an equilibrium in cutoff entry/exit strategies. In
contrast, the existence of an equilibrium in the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model of in-
dustry dynamics requires admissibility of mixed entry/exit strategies, contrary to the
assertion in their paper, that existing algorithms cannot cope with. In addition, we
provide a condition on the model’s primitives that ensures that the equilibrium is in
pure investment strategies. Building on this basic existence result, we first show that
a symmetric equilibrium exists under appropriate assumptions on the model’s primi-
tives. Second, we show that, as the distribution of the random scrap values/setup costs
becomes degenerate, equilibria in cutoff entry/exit strategies converge to equilibria in
mixed entry/exit strategies of the game of complete information. Finally, we provide
the first example of multiple symmetric equilibria in this literature.
1 Introduction
Over the past few years, the industrial organization literature has made considerable progress
in analyzing the dynamics of industry. In a seminal paper, Ericson & Pakes (1995) provide
a model of dynamic competition in an oligopolistic industry with investment, entry, and
exit. Their framework is a valuable addition to economists’ toolkits. Its applications to
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date have yielded novel insights into a number of important questions in industrial organi-
zation (e.g., Berry & Pakes 1993, Gowrisankaran 1999a, Fershtman & Pakes 2000) and it
provides a starting point for ongoing research in industrial organization (see Doraszelski &
Pakes (2007) for a survey) as well as in other fields such as international trade (Erdem &
Tybout 2003) and finance (Goettler, Parlour & Rajan 2005, Kadyrzhanova 2006). More re-
cently, Aguirregabiria & Mira (2007), Bajari, Benkard & Levin (2007), Pakes, Ostrovsky &
Berry (2006), and Pesendorfer & Schmidt-Dengler (2003) have developed estimation proce-
dures that allow the researcher to recover the primitives that underlie the dynamic industry
equilibrium. Consequently, it is now possible to take these models to the data with the
goal of conducting counterfactual experiments and policy analyses (e.g., Gowrisankaran &
Town 1997, Benkard 2004, Beresteanu & Ellickson 2005, Collard-Wexler 2005, Ryan 2005).
To achieve this goal the researcher has to be able to compute the Markov perfect equi-
librium using the estimated primitives. This, in turn, requires that an equilibrium exists.
Unfortunately, existence can not be guaranteed under the conditions in Ericson & Pakes
(1995).
Moreover, existence by itself is not enough for two reasons. First, contrary to the as-
sertion in their paper, the existence of an equilibrium in the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model
of industry dynamics requires admissibility of mixed strategies over discrete actions such
as entry and exit. But computing mixed strategies poses a formidable challenge despite
the considerable progress that has been made in the context of finite games (see McKelvey
& McLennan (1996) for a survey). Indeed, the algorithms developed by Pakes & McGuire
(1994, 2001) cannot cope with mixed entry/exit strategies. Worse, computing mixed strate-
gies over continuous actions such as investment is completely infeasible at present. Second,
the state space of the model explodes in the number of firms and quickly overwhelms current
computational capabilities. An important means of mitigating this “curse of dimensionality”
is to impose symmetry restrictions. For these reasons, computational tractability requires
existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies that is symmetric.
Our goal in this paper is to modify the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model just enough to
ensure that there exists a computationally tractable equilibrium for it. Thus, just as in the
Ericson & Pakes (1995) model, in our model incumbent firms decide in each period whether
to remain in the industry and how much to invest, and potential entrants decide whether to
enter the industry. Once the investment, entry, and exit decisions are made, firms compete
in the product market. All characteristics that are relevant to a firm’s profit from product
market competition are encoded in its “state,” and the firm is able to change its state over
time through investment. For example, a firm’s state may describe its production capacity,
cost structure, or the quality of its product.
We reformulate the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model as a game of incomplete information.
We show that doing so does not alter the fundamental economics of the model. It does,
however, allow us to prove the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies. We further
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show that under reasonable conditions the equilibrium is symmetric. This fulfills our goal
of establishing that the dynamic industry equilibrium is computationally tractable.
A further goal of this paper is to provide a step-by-step guide to formulating dynamic
models of industry equilibrium that are both computationally tractable and theoretically
rigorous. There are three difficulties that we now discuss in detail.
Cutoff entry/exit strategies. First, the existence of an equilibrium cannot be ensured
without allowing firms to randomize, in some way or another, over discrete actions such
as entry and exit. Since Ericson & Pakes (1995) do not provide for such mixing, a simple
example suffices to show that their claim of existence cannot possibly be correct (see section
3).
The game-theoretic literature has, of course, long recognized the importance of allowing
firms to randomize. Unfortunately, the existence theorems in the extant literature rely on
computationally intractable mixed strategies (see Mertens (2002) for a survey). Strictly
speaking, these existence theorems are not even applicable because they cover dynamic
stochastic games with either discrete (e.g., Fink 1964, Sobel 1971, Maskin & Tirole 2001)
or continuous actions (e.g., Federgruen 1978, Whitt 1980), whereas the Ericson & Pakes
(1995) model combines discrete entry/exit decisions with continuous investment decisions.
Lastly, they neglect the requirement of symmetry. In short, the existence theorems in the
game-theoretic literature are ill-suited for our purposes.
To eliminate the need for mixed entry/exit strategies without jeopardizing existence, we
extend Harsanyi’s (1973a) technique for purifying mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of static
games to Markov perfect equilibria of dynamic stochastic games and assume that at the
beginning of each period each potential entrant is assigned a random setup cost payable upon
entry, and each incumbent firm is assigned a random scrap value received upon exit. Setup
costs/scrap values are privately known, i.e., while a firm learns its own setup cost/scrap
value prior to making its decisions, its rivals’ setup costs/scrap values remain unknown
to it. Adding firm heterogeneity in the form of these randomly drawn, privately known
setup costs/scrap values leads to a game of incomplete information. This game always has
an equilibrium in cutoff entry/exit strategies that existing algorithms—notably Pakes &
McGuire (1994, 2001)—can handle after minor changes. Although a firm formally follows a
pure strategy in making its entry/exit decision, the dependence of its entry/exit decision on
its randomly drawn, privately known setup cost/scrap value implies that its rivals perceive
the firm as if it was following a mixed strategy. Note that random setup costs/scrap values
can substitute for mixed entry/exit strategies only if they are privately known. If they were
publicly observed, then its rivals could infer with certainty whether or not the firm will
enter/exit the industry. In this manner Harsanyi’s (1973a) insight that a perturbed game
of incomplete information can purify the mixed-strategy equilibria of an underlying game of
complete information enables us to settle the first and perhaps central difficulty in devising
a computationally tractable model.
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Pakes & McGuire (1994) suggest treating a potential entrant’s setup cost as a ran-
dom variable to overcome convergence problems in their algorithm.1 To our knowledge
Gowrisankaran (1995) is the first to make the connection between existence and randomiza-
tion of both entry and exit decisions. In his dynamic endogenous merger model he assumes
randomly drawn, privately known setup costs and scrap values but then goes on to write
down the Bellman equation of an incumbent firm as if scrap values were deterministic.
However, this equation, unless written down in error, fails to define a contraction and thus
renders inapplicable the dynamic programming techniques that are the basis of the Ericson
& Pakes (1995) model. Benkard (2004) also assumes randomly drawn, privately known
setup costs and scrap values in his model of dynamic competition among makers of wide-
body jet aircraft and incorporates these into his numerical algorithm in exactly the manner
that we propose in this paper. Thus our existence result applies to his model. Inexplicably
the Bellman equation of an incumbent firm that he writes down makes it appear as if he
treats scrap values as deterministic. This, however, is a proof reading error.2
In summary, while the idea of using random setup costs/scrap values instead of mixed
entry/exit strategies is part of the folklore in the literature following Ericson & Pakes (1995),
we do not know of a coherent treatment of the resulting game of incomplete information.
This is unfortunate because mistakes are easily made in formalizing a model of dynamic
competition and have potentially severe consequences. Moreover, the question remains
whether the “computational trick” of using random setup costs/scrap values changes the
nature of strategic interactions among firms. We show in section 4.3 that, as the distribu-
tion of the random scrap values/setup costs becomes degenerate, an equilibrium in cutoff
entry/exit strategies of the incomplete-information game converges to an equilibrium in
mixed entry/exit of the complete-information game. Hence, the addition of random scrap
values/setup costs does not change the nature of strategic interactions among firms. An im-
mediate consequence of our convergence result is there exists an equilibrium in the Ericson
& Pakes (1995) model provided that mixed entry/exit strategies are admissible.
Pure investment strategies. The second difficulty is to ensure pure investment strate-
gies. The extant game-theoretic literature routinely allows for randomization over continu-
1Following Rust (1994) the empirical literature has used randomness to “smooth out” discontinuities
caused by the discreteness of entry/exit decisions (e.g., Seim 2001). In independent work Pesendorfer &
Schmidt-Dengler (2003) use randomly drawn, privately known shocks to establish the existence of a Markov
perfect equilibrium in cutoff strategies in dynamic stochastic games with discrete actions (e.g., entry/exit
games). Their proof, which is quite elegant, requires that the shocks are unbounded, so that all actions are
played with positive probability at all times. In our setting this assumption seems awkward as it essentially
stipulates that someone is willing to pay an unbounded amount to acquire the assets of a firm that makes
bounded profits from product market competition.
2In June 2007 Lanier Benkard kindly wrote to us about our discussion of his paper in a previous version
of our paper. In his communication he agreed that his equation (1) on p. 587 as written is incorrect, but
asserted that he, in fact, had correctly calculated the equilibrium. To support this assertion he enclosed
excerpts from his code. Inspection convinced us that he did the calculation in the manner we argue is
appropriate.
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ous actions. Computing mixed strategies over continuous actions, however, is not practical.
We therefore must make sure that a firm’s optimal investment level is always unique, for
that guarantees that the equilibrium is in pure investment strategies. To achieve this, we
define a class of transition functions—functions which specify how firms’ investment deci-
sions affect the industry’s state-to-state transitions—that we call unique investment choice
(UIC) admissible and prove that if the transition function is UIC admissible, then a firm’s
investment choice is indeed uniquely determined. UIC admissibility is an easily verifiable
condition on the model’s primitives and is not overly limiting. Indeed, while the transition
functions used in the vast majority of applications of Ericson & Pakes’s (1995) framework
are UIC admissible, they all have restricted a firm to transit to immediately adjacent states.
Our condition establishes that this is unnecessarily restrictive, and we show how to specify
more general UIC admissible transition functions.
We emphasize that UIC admissibility is a sufficient condition and that, if it fails, unique-
ness of investment choice can often be achieved by other means. Purification is again a very
valuable tool. In particular, a part of the subsequent literature has assumed that the cost of
investment is randomly drawn and privately known. Ryan (2005) and Besanko, Doraszelski,
Lu & Satterthwaite (2006) extend our handling of entry and exit to the case of discrete (or
“lumpy”) investment. Their models remains computationally tractable because the equi-
librium is in cutoff investment strategies. Focusing on the case of continuous investment,
Jenkins, Liu, Matzkin & McFadden (2004) restrict the functional form of per-period payoffs
to ensure that a firm’s optimal investment level is almost always unique given a realization
of the cost of investment (see their assumption 4 and theorem 2 in appendix 1). Again
its rivals perceive the firm as if it was following a mixed strategy, thereby facilitating the
existence of an equilibrium, although computing these perceptions—as one must in order
to determine the rivals’ best replies to them—becomes somewhat more involved.
Our paper furthermore contributes to a growing literature that establishes the existence
of a Markov perfect equilibrium in pure strategies for a variety of dynamic stochastic games
whose structures are tailored to represent situations of economic interest. Curtat (1996) does
so in a game with a continuum of states by assuming that the per-period payoffs as well as
the transition distribution function satisfy monotonicity, supermodularity, and dominant-
diagonal conditions. This entails restrictions on how per-period payoffs can vary with
the state whereas our approach accommodates arbitrary per-period payoffs. Chakrabarti
(2003) shows that there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium in pure strategies in a dynamic
stochastic game with a continuum of players provided that the per-period payoffs and
the transition density function depend only on the average response of the players. In
subsequent work Escobar (2007) establishes the existence of a Markov perfect equilibrium in
pure strategies in a dynamic stochastic game with a countable state space and a continuum
of actions. He follows an approach similar to ours by first proving existence under the
assumption that a player’s best reply is convex for any value of continued play and then
5
characterizing the class of per-period payoffs and transition functions that ensure that this
is indeed the case. Since a unique best reply is a special case of a convex best reply, his
condition is more general than ours and may be applied to games with continuous actions
other than the investment decisions in the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model. However, there
is no systematic treatment of incomplete information as a means to purify the discrete
entry/exit decisions.
Symmetry. The third and final difficulty in devising a computationally tractable model
is to ensure that the equilibrium is not only in pure strategies, but is also symmetric.
In section 4.2 we show that this is the case under appropriate assumptions on the model’s
primitives. Symmetry is important because it eases the computational burden considerably.
Instead of having to compute value and policy functions for all firms, under symmetry it
suffices to compute value and policy functions for one firm. In addition, symmetry reduces
the size of the state space on which these functions are defined. Besides its computational
advantages, a symmetric equilibrium is an especially convincing solution concept in models
of dynamic competition with entry and exit because there is often no reason why a particular
entrant should be different from any other entrant. Rather, firm heterogeneity must arise
endogenously from the idiosyncratic outcomes that the ex ante identical firms realize from
their investments.
Resolving these difficulties allows us to establish that a computationally tractable sym-
metric equilibrium in pure strategies always exists. Given this, an important question is
whether or not it is unique. To our knowledge, all applications of Ericson & Pakes’s (1995)
framework have found a single equilibrium. In fact, it is often held that “nonuniqueness
does not seem to be a problem” in this setting (Pakes & McGuire 1994, p. 570). We settle
this issue by providing three examples of multiple symmetric equilibria. Our examples in
turn highlight firms’ investment decisions, their entry/exit decisions, and product market
competition as a possible source of multiple equilibria.
A minimalist view of our paper is that it employs standard techniques to rebuild the
shaky foundations of an important model. In particular, random setup costs have already
been suggested by Pakes & McGuire (1994) and both Gowrisankaran (1995) and Benkard
(2004) state that they have taken up this suggestion in their studies of the hospital and
airframe industries. But neither they nor any other authors wrote down precisely how
to implement this reasonable suggestion and how it actually works to ensure existence.
Consequently, learning how to use the Ericson & Pakes (1995) framework has been an
unnecessarily risky and error-prone undertaking, and we have ourselves wasted much time
when we initially incorrectly formulated the model. Our motivation for writing this paper
is therefore to provide a guide to formulating models of dynamic industry equilibrium that
is detailed enough to allow the reader to easily adapt its techniques to models that are
tailored to specific industries. We hope that such a step-by-step guide enables others to
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construct their models with the confidence that if their algorithm fails to converge, it is a
computational problem, not a poorly specified model for which no equilibrium exists.
The plan of the paper is as follows. We develop the model in section 2. In section 3 we
provide a series of simple examples to illustrate the key themes of the subsequent analysis
and discuss a number of computational issues. We turn to the analysis of the full model in
section 4 where we show that a computationally tractable symmetric equilibrium in pure
strategies always exists in the reformulated Ericson & Pakes (1995) model and that equilib-
ria of the incomplete-information game converge to equilibria of the complete-information
game. In section 5 we introduce UIC admissibility and explain how to specify general
transition functions that satisfy this criterion. In section 6 we provide several examples of
multiple equilibria. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
We study the evolution of an industry with heterogeneous firms. The model is dynamic,
time is discrete, and the horizon is infinite. There are two groups of firms, incumbent firms
and potential entrants. An incumbent firm has to decide each period whether to remain in
the industry and, if so, how much to invest. A potential entrant has to decide whether to
enter the industry and, if so, how much to invest. Once these decisions are made, product
market competition takes place.
Our model accounts for firm heterogeneity in two ways. First, we encode all character-
istics that are relevant to a firm’s profit from product market competition (e.g., production
capacity, cost structure, or product quality) in its “state.” A firm is able to change its
state over time through investment. While a higher investment today is no guarantee for
a more favorable state tomorrow, it does ensure a more favorable distribution over future
states. By acknowledging that a firm’s transition from one state to another is subject to
an idiosyncratic shock, our model allows for variability in the fortunes of firms even if they
carry out identical strategies. Second, to account for differences in opportunity costs across
firms we assume that incumbents have random scrap values (received upon exit) and that
entrants have random setup costs (payable upon entry). Since a firm’s particular circum-
stances change over time, we model scrap values and setup costs as being drawn anew each
period.
States and firms. Let N denote the number of firms. Firm n is described by its state
ωn ∈ Ω where Ω = {1, . . . ,M,M + 1} is its set of possible states. States 1, . . . ,M describe
an active firm while state M +1 identifies the firm as being inactive.3 At any point in time
the industry is completely characterized by the list of firms’ states ω = (ω1, . . . , ωN ) ∈ S
3This formulation allows firms to differ from each other in more than one dimension. Suppose that a firm
is characterized by its capacity and its marginal cost of production. If there are M1 levels of capacity and
M2 levels of cost, then each of the M =M1M2 possible combinations of capacity and cost defines a state.
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where S = ΩN is the state space.4 We refer to ωn as the state of firm n and to ω as the
state of the industry.
If N∗ is the number of incumbent firms (i.e., active firms), then there are N − N∗
potential entrants (i.e., inactive firms). Thus, once an incumbent firm exits the industry, a
potential entrant automatically takes its “slot” and has to decide whether or not to enter
the industry.5 Potential entrants are drawn from a large pool. They are short-lived and
base their entry decisions on the net present value of entering today; potential entrants
do not take the option value of delaying entry into account. In contrast, incumbent firms
are long-lived and solve intertemporal maximization problems to reach their exit decisions.
They discount future payoffs using a discount factor of β.
Timing. In each period the sequence of events is as follows:
1. Incumbent firms learn their scrap value and decide on exit and investment. Potential
entrants learn their setup cost and decide on entry and investment.
2. Incumbent firms compete in the product market.
3. Exit and entry decisions are implemented.
4. The investment decisions of the remaining incumbents and new entrants are carried
out and their uncertain outcomes are realized.
Throughout we use ω to denote the state of the industry at the beginning of the period
and ω′ to denote its state at the end of the period after the state-to-state transitions are
realized. Firms observe the state at the beginning of the period as well as the outcomes of
the entry, exit, and investment decisions during the period.
While the entry, exit, and investment decisions are made simultaneously, we assume
that an incumbent’s investment decision is carried out only if it remains in the industry.
Similarly, we assume that an entrant’s investment decision is carried out only if it enters the
industry. Hence, an optimizing incumbent firm will choose its investment at the beginning
of each period under the presumption that it does not exit this period and an optimizing
potential entrant will do so under the presumption that it enters the industry.
Incumbent firms. Suppose ωn 6= M + 1 and consider incumbent firm n. We assume
that at the beginning of each period each incumbent firm draws a random scrap value
from a distribution F (·) with E (φn) = φ.6 Scrap values are independently and identically
4Time-varying characteristics of the competitive environment are easily added to the description of the
industry. Besanko & Doraszelski (2004), for example, add a demand state to the list of firms’ states in order
to study the effects of demand growth and demand cycles on capacity dynamics.
5Limiting the number of potential entrants to N −N∗ is not innocuous. Increasing N −N∗ by increasing
N exacerbates the coordination problem that potential entrants face.
6It is straightforward to allow firm n’s scrap value φn to vary systematically with its state ωn by replacing
F (·) by Fωn(·).
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distributed across firms and periods. Incumbent firm n learns its scrap value φn prior to
making its exit and investment decisions, but the scrap values of its rivals remain unknown
to it. Let χn(ω, φn) = 1 indicate that the decision of incumbent firm n, who has drawn
scrap value φn, is to remain in the industry in state ω and let χn(ω, φn) = 0 indicate that
its decision is to exit the industry, collect the scrap value φn, and perish. Since this decision
is conditioned on its private φn, it is a random variable from the perspective of other firms.
We use ξn(ω) =
∫
χn(ω, φn)dF (φn) to denote the probability that incumbent firm n remains
in the industry in state ω.
This is the first place where our model diverges from Ericson & Pakes (1995), who
assume that scrap values are constant across firms and periods. As we show in section
3, deterministic scrap values raise serious existence issues. In the limit, however, as the
distribution of φn becomes degenerate, our model collapses to theirs.
If the incumbent remains in the industry, it competes in the product market. Let pin(ω)
denote the current profit of incumbent firm n from product market competition in state
ω. We stipulate that pin(·) is a reduced-form profit function that fully incorporates the
nature of product market competition in the industry. In addition to receiving a profit, the
incumbent incurs the investment xn(ω) ∈ [0, x¯] that it decided on at the beginning of the
period and moves from state ωn to state ω′n 6= M + 1 in accordance with the transition
probabilities specified below.
Potential entrants. Suppose that ωn = M + 1 and consider potential entrant n. We
assume that at the beginning of each period each potential entrant draws a random setup
cost from a distribution F e(·) with E (φen) = φe. Like scrap values, setup costs are inde-
pendently and identically distributed across firms and periods, and its setup cost is private
to a firm. If potential entrant n enters the industry, it incurs the setup cost φen. If it stays
out, it receives nothing and perishes. We use χen(ω, φ
e
n) = 1 to indicate that the decision of
potential entrant n, who has drawn setup cost φen, is to enter the industry in state ω and
χen(ω, φ
e
n) = 0 to indicate that its decision is to stay out. From the point of view of other
firms ξen(ω) =
∫
χen(ω, φ
e
n)dF
e(φen) denotes the probability that potential entrant n enters
the industry in state ω.
Unlike an incumbent, the entrant does not compete in the product market. Instead
it undergoes a setup period upon committing to entry. The entrant incurs its previously
chosen investment xen(ω) ∈ [0, x¯e] and moves to state ω′n 6=M +1. Hence, at the end of the
setup period, the entrant becomes an incumbent.
This is the second place where we generalize the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model. They
assume that, unlike exit decisions, entry decisions are made sequentially. We assume that
entry decisions are made simultaneously, thus allowing more than one firm per period to
enter the industry in an uncoordinated fashion. We also allow the potential entrant to
make an initial investment in order to improve the odds that it enters the industry in a
more favorable state. This contrasts with Ericson & Pakes (1995) where the entrant is
9
randomly assigned to an arbitrary position and thus has no control over its initial position
within the industry.7
We make these two changes because industry evolution frequently takes the form of a
preemption race (Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz & Tirole 1983, Harris & Vickers 1987, Besanko
& Doraszelski 2004). During such a race firms invest heavily as long as they are neck-
and-neck. But once one of the firms manages to pull ahead, the lagging firms “give up,”
thereby allowing the leading firm to attain a dominant position. In a preemption race,
an early entrant has a head start over a late entrant, so an imposed order of entry may
prove to be decisive for the structure of the industry. Moreover, denying an entrant control
over its initial position within the industry makes it all the harder to “catch up.” Our
specification of the entry process does not suffer from these drawbacks and makes the model
more realistic by endogenizing the intensity of entry activity. As an additional benefit, our
parallel treatment of entry and exit as well as incumbents’ and entrants’ investment decisions
simplifies the model’s exposition and eases the computational burden.
Transition probabilities. The probability that the industry transits from today’s state
ω to tomorrow’s state ω′ is determined jointly by the investment decisions of the in-
cumbent firms that remain in the industry and the potential entrants that enter the in-
dustry. Formally the transition probabilities are encoded in the transition function P :
S2 × {0, 1}2N × [0, x¯]N × [0, x¯e]N → [0, 1]. Thus, P (ω′, ω, χ (ω, φ) , χe (ω, φe) , x (ω) , xe (ω))
is the probability that the industry moves from state ω to state ω′ given that the incumbent
firms’ exit decision are χ (ω, φ) = (χ1 (ω, φ1) , . . . , χN (ω, φN )), their investment decisions are
x (ω) = (x1 (ω) , . . . , xN (ω)), etc. Necessarily P (ω′, ω, χ (ω, φ) , χe (ω, φe) , x (ω) , xe (ω)) ≥
0 and
∑
ω′∈S P (ω
′, ω, χ (ω, φ) , χe (ω, φe) , x (ω) , xe (ω)) = 1.
In the special case of independent transitions, the transition function P (·) can be fac-
tored as ∏
n=1,...,N,
ωn 6=M+1
Pn(ω′n, ωn, χn (ω, φn)xn (ω))
∏
n=1,...,N,
ωn=M+1
P en(ω
′
n, χ
e
n (ω, φ
e
n) , x
e
n (ω)),
where Pn (·) gives the probability that incumbent firm n transits from state ωn to state ω′n
conditional on its exit decision being χn(ω, φn) and its investment decision being xn(ω) and
P en(·) gives the probability that potential entrant n transits to state ω′n. In general, however,
transitions need not be independent across firms. Independence is violated, for example,
in the presence of demand or cost shocks that are common to firms or in the presence of
externalities.
Since a firm’s scrap value or setup cost is private information, its exit or entry decision
is a random variable from the perspective of an outside observer. The outside observer
thus has to “integrate out” over all possible realizations of firms’ exit and entry decisions
7We may nest their formulation by setting x¯e = 0.
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to obtain the probability that the industry transits from state ω to state ω′:∫
. . .
∫
P (ω′, ω, χ(ω, φ), χe(ω, φe), x(ω), xe(ω))
∏
n=1,...,N,
ωn 6=M+1
dF (φn)
∏
n=1,...,N,
ωn=M+1
dF e(φen)
=
∑
ι,ιe∈{0,1}N
[
P (ω′, ω, ι, ιe, x(ω), xe(ω))
×
∏
n=1,...,N,
ωn 6=M+1
ξn(ω)ιn(1− ξn(ω))1−ιn
∏
n=1,...,N,
ωn=M+1
ξen(ω)
ιen(1− ξen(ω))1−ι
e
n
]
. (1)
To see this, recall that scrap values and setup costs are independently distributed across
firms. Since, from the point of view of other firms, the probability that incumbent firm n
remains in the industry in state ω is ξn(ω) =
∫
χn(ω, φn)dF (φn), a particular realization ι =
(ι1, . . . , ιN ) of incumbent firms’ exit decisions occurs with probability
∏
n=1,...,N ξn(ω)
ιn(1−
ξn(ω))1−ιn . Similarly, a particular realization ιe = (ιe1, . . . , ιeN ) of potential entrants’ entry
decisions occurs with probability
∏
n=1,...,N ξ
e
n(ω)
ιen(1 − ξen(ω))1−ιen . Equation (1) results
from observing that if ωn 6=M+1 (ωn =M+1), then firm n is an incumbent (entrant) and
conditioning on all possible realizations of incumbent firms’ exit decisions ι and potential
entrants’ entry decisions ιe.
The crucial implication of equation (1) is that the probability of a transition from state
ω to state ω′ hinges on the exit and entry probabilities ξ(ω) and ξe(ω). Thus, when forming
an expectation over the industry’s future state, a firm does not need to know the entire exit
and entry rules χ−n(ω, ·) and χe−n(ω, ·) of its rivals; rather it suffices to know their exit and
entry probabilities.
An incumbent’s problem. Suppose that the industry is in state ω with ωn 6= M +
1. Incumbent firm n solves an intertemporal maximization problem to reach its exit and
investment decisions. Let Vn(ω, φn) denote the expected net present value of all future cash
flows to incumbent firm n, computed under the presumption that firms behave optimally,
when the industry is in state ω and the firm has drawn scrap value φn. Note that its scrap
value is part of the payoff-relevant characteristics of the incumbent firm. This is rather
obvious: an incumbent firm that can sell off its assets for one dollar may behave very
differently than an otherwise identical incumbent firm that can sell off its assets for one
million dollars. Hence, once incumbent firm n has learned its scrap value φn, its decisions
and thus also the expected net present value of its future cash flows, Vn(ω, φn), depend on
it. Unlike deterministic scrap values, random scrap values are part of the state space of
the game. This is undesirable from a computational perspective because the computational
burden is increasing with the size of the state space. Fortunately, as we show below,
integrating out over the random scrap values eliminates their disadvantage but preserves
their advantage for ensuring the existence of an equilibrium.
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Vn(ω, φn) is defined recursively by the solution to the following Bellman equation
Vn(ω, φn) = sup
χ˜n(ω,φn)∈{0,1},
x˜n(ω,φn)∈[0,x¯]
pin(ω) + (1− χ˜n(ω, φn))φn + χ˜n(ω, φn)
{
− x˜n(ω, φn)
+βE {Vn(ω′)|ω, ω′n 6=M + 1, x˜n(ω, φn), ξ−n(ω), ξe(ω), x−n(ω), xe(ω)}
}
,(2)
where, with an overloading of notation, Vn(ω) =
∫
Vn(ω, φn)dF (φn) is the expected value
function. Note that while Vn(ω, φn) is the value function after the firm has drawn its scrap
value, Vn(ω) is the expected value function, i.e., the value function before the firm has drawn
its scrap value. The RHS of the Bellman equation is composed of the incumbent’s profit
from product market competition pin(ω) and, depending on the exit decision χ˜n(ω, φn),
either the return to exiting, φn, or the return to remaining in the industry. The latter is
given by the term inside brackets and is in turn composed of two parts: the investment
x˜n(ω, φn) and the net present value of the incumbent’s future cash flows, βE {Vn(ω′)|·}.
Several remarks are in order. First, since scrap values are independent across periods, the
firm’s future returns are described by its expected value function Vn (ω′). Second, recall
that ω′ denotes the state at the end of the current period after the state-to-state transitions
have been realized. The expectation operator reflects the fact that ω′ is unknown at the
beginning of the current period when the decisions are made. The incumbent conditions
its expectations on the decisions of the other incumbents, ξ−n(ω) and x−n(ω), a well as on
the decisions of all potential entrants, ξe(ω) and xe(ω). It also conditions its expectations
on its own investment choice and presumes that it remains in the industry in state ω, i.e.,
it conditions on ω′n 6= M + 1. Note that with the recursive formulation of the incumbent’s
problem in equation (2) there is no need to condition on firms’ entire strategies.
Since investment is chosen conditional on remaining in the industry, the problem of
incumbent firm n can be broken up into two parts. First, the incumbent chooses its invest-
ment. The optimal investment choice is independent of the firm’s scrap value, and there
is thus no need to index xn(ω) by φn. This also justifies making the expectation operator
conditional on x−n(ω) (as opposed to scrap-value specific investment decisions). Second,
given its investment choice, the incumbent decides whether or not to remain in the industry.
The incumbent’s exit decision clearly depends on its scrap value, just as its rivals’ exit and
entry decisions depend on their scrap values and setup costs. Nevertheless, it is enough to
condition on ξ−n(ω) and ξe(ω) in light of equation (1).
The optimal exit decision of incumbent firm n who has drawn scrap value φn is charac-
terized by
χn(ω, φn) =
{
1 if φn ≤ φ¯n(ω),
0 if φn ≥ φ¯n(ω),
12
where
φ¯n(ω) = sup
x˜n(ω)∈[0,x¯]
−x˜n(ω)+βE {Vn(ω′)|ω, ω′n 6=M+1, x˜n(ω), ξ−n(ω), ξe(ω), x−n(ω), xe(ω)}
(3)
denotes the cutoff scrap value for which the incumbent is indifferent between remaining
in the industry and exiting. Hence, the solution to the incumbent’s decision problem has
the reservation property. Moreover, provided that the distribution of scrap values F (·)
has a continuous and positive density, incumbent firm n has a unique optimal exit choice
for all scrap values (except for a set of measure zero). Without loss of generality, we can
therefore restrict attention to decision rules of the form 1[φn < φ¯n(ω)], where 1[·] denotes
the indicator function. These decision rules can be represented in two ways:
1. with the cutoff scrap value φ¯n(ω) itself; or
2. with the probability ξn(ω) of incumbent firm n remaining in the industry in state ω.
This is without loss of information because ξn(ω) =
∫
χn(ω, φn)dF (φn) =
∫
1[φn < φ¯n(ω)]dF (φn) =
F (φ¯n(ω)) is equivalent to F−1(ξn(ω)) = φ¯n(ω).8 The second representation proves to be
more useful and we use it below almost exclusively.
Next we turn to payoffs. Imposing the reservation property and integrating over φn on
both sides of equation (2) yields
Vn(ω) =
∫
sup
ξ˜n(ω)∈[0,1],
x˜n(ω)∈[0,x¯]
pin(ω) + (1− 1[φn < F−1(ξ˜n(ω))])φn + 1[φn < F−1(ξ˜n(ω))]
{
− x˜n(ω)
+βE {Vn(ω′)|ω, ω′n 6=M + 1, x˜n(ω), ξ−n(ω), ξe(ω), x−n(ω), xe(ω)}
}
dF (φn)
= sup
ξ˜n(ω)∈[0,1],
x˜n(ω)∈[0,x¯]
pin(ω) + (1− ξ˜n(ω))φ+
∫
φn>F−1(ξ˜n(ω))
(φn − φ)dF (φn) + ξ˜n(ω)
{
− x˜n(ω)
+βE {Vn(ω′)|ω, ω′n 6=M + 1, x˜n(ω), ξ−n(ω), ξe(ω), x−n(ω), xe(ω)}
}
. (4)
Two essential points should be noted: First, an optimizing incumbent cares about the
expectation of the scrap value conditional on collecting it, E
{
φn|φn > F−1(ξ˜n(ω))
}
, rather
than its unconditional expectation E (φn) = φ. The term
∫
φn>F−1(ξ˜n(ω))(φn − φ)dF (φn) =
(1− ξ˜n(ω))
(
E
{
φn|φn > F−1(ξ˜n(ω))
}
− φ
)
captures the difference between the conditional
and the unconditional expectation. It reflects our assumption that scrap values are random
and, consequently, is not present in a game of complete information such as Ericson &
Pakes (1995), where scrap values are constant across firms and periods. Second, the state
space is effectively the same in the games of incomplete and complete information since the
8If the support of F (·) is bounded, we define F−1(0) (F−1(1)) to be the infimum (supremum) of the
support.
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constituent parts of the Bellman equation (4) depend on the state of the industry ω but
not on the random scrap value φn. Hence, by integrating out over the random scrap values,
we have successfully eliminated their computational disadvantage.
An entrant’s problem. Suppose that the industry is in state ω with ωn =M + 1. The
expected net present value of all future cash flows to potential entrant n when the industry
is in state ω and the firm has drawn setup cost φen is
V en (ω, φ
e
n) = sup
χ˜en(ω,φ
e
n)∈{0,1},
x˜en(ω,φ
e
n)∈[0,x¯e]
χ˜en(ω, φ
e
n)
{
− φen − x˜en(ω, φen)
+βE {Vn(ω′)|ω, ω′n 6=M + 1, x˜en(ω, φen), ξ(ω), ξe−n(ω), x(ω), xe−n(ω)}
}
. (5)
Unlike the incumbent’s value function, the entrant’s value function is not defined recur-
sively. Instead, it can be easily calculated given the incumbent’s value function because the
entrant is short-lived and does not solve an intertemporal maximization problem to reach
its decisions.9 Depending on the entry decision χen(ω, φ
e), the RHS of the above equation is
either 0 or the expected return to entering the industry, which is in turn composed of two
parts. First, the entrant pays the setup cost and sinks its investment, yielding a current
cash flow of −φen − x˜en(ω, φen). Second, the entrant takes the net present value of its future
cash flows into account. Since potential entrant n becomes incumbent firm n at the end
of the setup period, this is given by βE {Vn(ω′)|·}. The entrant conditions its expectations
on the decisions of all incumbents, ξ(ω) and x(ω) as well as on the decisions of the other
entrants, ξe−n(ω) and xe−n(ω). It also conditions its expectations on its own investment
choice and presumes that it enters the industry in state ω, i.e., it conditions on ω′n 6=M+1.
Similar to the incumbent’s problem, the entrant’s problem can be broken up into two
parts. Since investment is chosen conditional on entering the industry, the optimal invest-
ment choice xen(ω) is independent of the firm’s setup cost φ
e
n. Given its investment choice,
the entrant then decides whether or not to enter the industry. The optimal entry decision
is characterized by
ξen(ω, φ
e
n) =
{
1 if φen ≤ φ¯en(ω),
0 if φen ≥ φ¯en(ω),
where
φ¯en(ω) = sup
x˜en(ω)∈[0,x¯e]
−x˜en(ω)+βE
{
Vn(ω′)|ω, ω′n 6=M + 1, x˜en(ω), ξ(ω), ξe−n(ω), x(ω), xe−n(ω)
}
(6)
denotes the cutoff setup cost. As with incumbents, the solution to the entrant’s decision
problem has the reservation property and we can restrict attention to decision rules of the
9It is easy to allow for long-lived entrants by adding the recursive term (1−χ˜en(ω, φen))βE {V en (ω′)|ω, ω′n =
M + 1, ξ(ω), ξe−n(ω), x(ω), x
e
−n(ω)}, where V en (ω) =
∫
V en (ω, φ
e
n)dF
e(φen) is the expected value function, to
equation (5).
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form 1[φen < φ¯
e
n(ω)]. The set of all such rules can be indexed by the cutoff setup cost φ¯
e
n(ω)
or by the corresponding probability ξen(ω) of potential entrant n entering the industry in
state ω. Imposing the reservation property and integrating over φen on both sides of equation
(5) yields
V en (ω) = sup
ξ˜en(ω)∈[0,1],
x˜en(ω)∈[0,x¯e]
−
∫
φen<F
e−1(ξ˜en(ω))
(φen − φe)dF e(φen) + ξ˜en(ω)
{
− φe − x˜en(ω)
+βE {Vn(ω′)|ω, ω′n 6=M + 1, x˜en(ω), ξ(ω), ξe−n(ω), x(ω), xe−n(ω)}
}
, (7)
where V en (ω) =
∫
V en (ω, φ
e
n)dF
e(φen) is the expected value function. The term−
∫
φen<F
e−1(ξ˜en(ω))
(φen−
φe)dF e(φen) is again not present in a setting with complete information.
Notation. To save on notation, we identify the nth incumbent firm with firm n in states
ωn 6=M +1 and the nth potential entrant with firm n in state ωn =M +1 in what follows.
That is, we define
V en (ω1, . . . , ωn−1, ωn, ωn+1, . . . , ωN ) = Vn(ω1, . . . , ωn−1,M + 1, ωn+1, . . . , ωN ),
ξen(ω1, . . . , ωn−1, ωn, ωn+1, . . . , ωN ) = ξn(ω1, . . . , ωn−1,M + 1, ωn+1, . . . , ωN ),
xen(ω1, . . . , ωn−1, ωn, ωn+1, . . . , ωN ) = xn(ω1, . . . , ωn−1,M + 1, ωn+1, . . . , ωN ).
Let S = ΩN = {ω1, . . . , ω|S|}. Define the |S| ×N matrix V by
V = (V1, . . . , VN ) =

V1(ω1) . . . VN (ω1)
...
...
V1(ω|S|) . . . VN (ω|S|)

and the |S| × (N − 1) matrix V−n by V−n = (V1, . . . , Vn−1, Vn+1, . . . , VN ). Vn represents
the value function of firm n or, more precisely, the value function of incumbent firm n if
ωn 6= M + 1 and the value function of potential entrant n if ωn = M + 1. Define V (ω) =
(V1(ω), . . . , VN (ω)) and V−n(ω) = (V1(ω), . . . , Vn−1(ω), Vn+1(ω), . . . , VN (ω)). Define the
|S| ×N matrices ξ and x similarly. Finally, define the |S| × 2N matrix u by u = (ξ, x). In
what follows we use the terms matrix and function interchangeably.
Actions, strategies, and payoffs. An action or decision for firm n in state ω specifies
either the probability that the incumbent remains in the industry or the probability that
the entrant enters the industry along with an investment choice: un(ω) = (ξn(ω), xn(ω)) ∈
Un(ω) where
Un(ω) =
{
[0, 1]× [0, x¯] if ωn 6=M + 1,
[0, 1]× [0, x¯e] if ωn =M + 1.
(8)
15
denotes firm n’s feasible actions in state ω. A strategy or policy for firm n specifies an action
un(ω) ∈ Un(ω) for each state ω. Such a strategy is called Markovian because it is restricted
to be a function of the current state rather than the entire history of the game. Define
Un = ×ω∈SUn(ω) to be the strategy space of firm n and U = ×Nn=1Un to be the strategy
space of the entire industry. By construction Un(ω) and hence Un and U are nonempty,
convex, and compact assuming that x¯ <∞ and x¯e <∞.
Using the above notation, the Bellman equations (4) and (7) of incumbent firm n and
potential entrant n, respectively, can more compactly be stated as
Vn(ω) = sup
u˜n∈Un(ω)
hn(ω, u˜n(ω), u−n(ω), Vn), (9)
where
hn(ω, u(ω), Vn)
=

pin(ω) + (1− ξn(ω))φ+
∫
φn>F−1(ξn(ω))(φn − φ)dF (φn)
+ξn(ω)
{
− xn(ω) + βE {Vn(ω′)|ω, ω′n 6=M + 1, ξ−n(ω), x(ω)}
}
if ωn 6=M + 1,
− ∫φen<F e−1(ξn(ω))(φen − φe)dF e (φen)
+ξn(ω)
{
− φe − xn(ω) + βE {Vn(ω′)|ω, ω′n 6=M + 1, ξ−n(ω), x(ω)}
}
if ωn =M + 1.
The number hn(ω, u(ω), Vn) represents the return to firm n in state ω when the firms use
actions u(ω) and firm n’s future returns are described by the value function Vn. The function
hn(·) is called firm n’s return (Denardo 1967, p. 166) or local income function (Whitt 1980,
p. 35).
Equilibrium. Our solution concept is that of Markov perfect equilibrium. An equilibrium
involves value and policy functions V and u such that (i) given u−n, Vn solves the Bellman
equation (9) for all n and (ii) given u−n(ω) and Vn, un(ω) solves the maximization problem
on the RHS of this equation for all ω and all n. A firm thus behaves optimally in every
state, irrespective of whether this state is on or off the equilibrium path. Moreover, since
the horizon is infinite and the influence of past play is captured in the current state, there
is a one-to-one correspondence between subgames and states. Hence, any Markov perfect
equilibrium is subgame perfect. Note that since a best reply to Markovian strategies u−n is a
Markovian strategy un, a Markov perfect equilibrium remains a subgame perfect equilibrium
even if more general strategies are considered.
3 Examples
In this section we provide a series of simple examples to illustrate the key themes of the
subsequent analysis. Our first example demonstrates that if scrap values/setup costs are
constant across firms and periods as in the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model, then a symmetric
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equilibrium in pure entry/exit strategies may fail to exist, contrary to their assertion.10 Our
second example shows how to incorporate random scrap values/setup costs in order to ensure
that a symmetric equilibrium in cutoff entry/exit strategies exists. In the remainder of this
section we explain how to solve the incomplete-information game using a slightly modified
version of Pakes & McGuire’s (1994) algorithm and we argue that this is no more demanding
than computing a (possibly nonexistent) equilibrium in pure entry/exit strategies of the
complete-information game whereas the alternative of computing an equilibrium in mixed
entry/exit strategies is infeasible in most (if not all) applications of Ericson & Pakes’s (1995)
framework.
Example: Deterministic scrap values/setup costs. We set N = 2 and M = 1. This
implies that the industry is either a monopoly (states (1, 2) and (2, 1)) or a duopoly (state
(1, 1)). Moreover, since there is just one “active” state, there is no incentive to invest, so
we set xn(ω) = 0 for all ω and all n in what follows. To simplify things further, we assume
that entry is prohibitively costly and focus entirely on exit.11 Let pi(ω1, ω2) denote firm
1’s current profit in state ω = (ω1, ω2). We assume that the profit function is symmetric.
This implies that firm 2’s current profit in state ω is pi(ω2, ω1). Pick the deterministic scrap
value φ such that
βpi(1, 1)
1− β < φ <
βpi(1, 2)
1− β . (10)
Hence, while a monopoly is viable, a duopoly is not. This gives rise to a “war of attrition.”
The sole decision that a firm must make is whether or not to exit the industry. Consider
firm 1. Given firm 2’s exit decision χ(1, 1) ∈ {0, 1}, the Bellman equation defines its value
function:
V (1, 2) = sup
χ˜(1,2)∈{0,1}
pi(1, 2) + (1− χ˜(1, 2))φ+ χ˜(1, 2)βV (1, 2),
V (1, 1) = sup
χ˜(1,1)∈{0,1}
pi(1, 1) + (1− χ˜(1, 1))φ+ χ˜(1, 1)β
{
χ(1, 1)V (1, 1) + (1− χ(1, 1))V (1, 2)
}
.
Recall that χ˜(ω) = 1 indicates that firm 1 remains in the industry in state ω and χ˜(ω) = 0
indicates that it exits. The optimal exit decisions χ˜(1, 2) and χ˜(1, 1) of firm 1 satisfy
χ˜ (ω) =
{
1 if φ ≤ φ¯(ω),
0 if φ ≥ φ¯(ω),
10We defer a formal definition of our symmetry notion to section 4.2.
11A similar example can be constructed to demonstrate that there may not exist a symmetric equilibrium
in pure entry strategies.
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where
φ¯(1, 2) = βV (1, 2), (11)
φ¯(1, 1) = β
{
χ(1, 1)V (1, 1) + (1− χ(1, 1))V (1, 2)
}
. (12)
Moreover, in a symmetric equilibrium we must have χ˜(ω1, ω2) = χ(ω2, ω1).
To show that there is no symmetric equilibrium in pure exit strategies, we show that
(χ(1, 2), χ(1, 1)) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)} leads to a contradiction. Working through
these cases, suppose first that χ(1, 2) = 0. Then V (1, 2) = pi(1, 2) + φ and the assumed
optimality of χ(1, 2) = 0 implies
φ ≥ φ¯(1, 2) = β(pi(1, 2) + φ)⇔ φ ≥ βpi(1, 2)
1− β .
This contradicts assumption (10); therefore no equilibrium with χ(1, 2) = 0 exists. Next
consider χ(1, 1) = 1. Then V (1, 1) = pi(1,1)1−β and the assumed optimality of χ(1, 1) = 1
implies
φ ≤ φ¯(1, 1) = βpi(1, 1)
1− β .
This contradicts assumption (10); therefore no equilibrium with χ(1, 1) = 1 exists. This
leaves us with one more possibility: χ(1, 2) = 1 and χ(1, 1) = 0. Here V (1, 2) = pi(1,2)1−β and
the assumed optimality of χ(1, 2) = 1 implies
φ ≥ φ¯(1, 1) = βpi(1, 2)
1− β ,
which again contradicts assumption (10). Hence, there cannot be a symmetric equilibrium
in pure exit strategies.12
For future reference we note that although there is no symmetric equilibrium in pure
exit strategies there is one in mixed exit strategies given by
V (1, 2) =
pi(1, 2)
1− β , V (1, 1) = pi(1, 1) + φ,
ξ(1, 2) = 1, ξ(1, 1) =
(1− β)φ− βpi(1, 2)
β ((1− β)(pi(1, 1) + φ)− pi(1, 2)) .
Example: Random scrap values/setup costs. Pakes & McGuire (1994) suggest the
use of random setup costs to overcome convergence problems in their algorithm. Conver-
gence problems may be indicative of nonexistence in pure entry/exit strategies. In the
example above, an algorithm that seeks a (nonexistent) symmetric equilibrium in pure
strategies tends to cycle between prescribing that neither firm should exit from a duopolis-
12In this particular example there exist two asymmetric equilibria in pure exit strategies. In each of them,
one firm exits in state (1, 1), the other remains in the industry.
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tic industry and prescribing that both firms should exit.
To restore existence we introduced in section 2 random scrap values in addition to the
random setup costs suggested by Pakes & McGuire (1994). We now modify the above
example to illustrate this use of incomplete information. Specifically, we assume that scrap
values are independently and identically distributed across firms and periods, and that its
scrap value is private to a firm. We write firm 1’s scrap value as φ + ²θ, where ² > 0 is a
constant scale factor that measures the importance of incomplete information. Overloading
notation, we assume that θ ∼ F (·) with E (θ) = 0. The Bellman equation of firm 1 is
V (1, 2) = sup
ξ˜(1,2)∈[0,1]
pi(1, 2) + (1− ξ˜(1, 2))φ+ ²
∫
θ>F−1(ξ˜(1,2))
θdF (θ) + ξ˜(1, 2)βV (1, 2),
V (1, 1) = sup
ξ˜(1,1)∈[0,1]
pi(1, 1) + (1− ξ˜(1, 1))φ+ ²
∫
θ>F−1(ξ˜(1,1))
θdF (θ)
+ξ˜(1, 1)β
{
ξ(1, 1)V (1, 1) + (1− ξ(1, 1))V (1, 2)
}
,
where ξ(1, 1) ∈ [0, 1] is firm 2’s exit decision. The optimal exit decisions of firm 1, ξ˜(1, 2)
and ξ˜(1, 1), are characterized by ξ˜(ω) = F
(
φ¯(ω)−φ
²
)
,13 where
φ¯(1, 2) = βV (1, 2),
φ¯(1, 1) = β
{
ξ(1, 1)V (1, 1) + (1− ξ(1, 1))V (1, 2)
}
.
Moreover, in a symmetric equilibrium we must have ξ˜(ω1, ω2) = ξ(ω2, ω1). This yields a
system of four equations in four unknowns V (1, 2), V (1, 1), ξ(1, 2), and ξ(1, 1).
Obtaining analytic solutions is complicated by the fact that the equations that define
the value function are no longer linear in V (ω) because V (ω) enters φ¯(ω). For analytic
convenience, let θ be uniformly distributed on the interval [−1, 1]. This implies
∫
θ>F−1(ξ(ω))
θdF (θ) =

0 if F−1(ξ(ω)) ≤ −1,
1−F−1(ξ(ω))2
4 if −1 < F−1(ξ(ω)) < 1,
0 if F−1(ξ(ω)) ≥ 1,
where F−1(ξ(ω)) = 2ξ(ω)−1. There are nine cases to be considered, depending on whether
ξ(1, 1) is equal to 0, between 0 and 1, or equal to 1 and on whether ξ(1, 2) is equal to 0,
between 0 and 1, or equal to 1. Table 1 specifies parameters values.
A case-by-case analysis shows that, with random scrap values, there always exists a
unique symmetric equilibrium. If ² > 5, the equilibrium involves 0 < ξ(1, 2) < 1 and
0 < ξ(1, 1) < 1, and if ² ≤ 5, it involves ξ(1, 2) = 1 and 0 < ξ(1, 1) < 1. Table 2
describes the equilibrium for various values of ². Given the parameter values in Table
13To see this, note that the first and second derivatives of the RHS of the Bellman equation are given by
d(.)
dξ˜(ω)
= −φ− ²F−1(ξ˜(ω)) + φ¯(ω) and d2(.)
dξ˜(ω)2
= −² 1
F ′(F−1(ξ˜(ω))) , respectively.
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parameter pi(1, 1) pi(1, 2) φ β
value 0 1 15 2021
Table 1: Parameter values.
² V (1, 2) V (1, 1) ξ(1, 2) ξ(1, 1)
10 23.817544 21.159671 0.884169 0.784836
5 21 18.044922 1 0.780375
2 21 16.392989 1 0.834562
1 21 15.730888 1 0.854920
0.1 21 15.076219 1 0.873034
0.01 21 15.007653 1 0.874804
0.001 21 15.000766 1 0.874980
10−6 21 15.000001 1 0.875000
Table 2: Equilibrium with random scrap values.
1, the symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies of the game of complete information is
V (1, 2) = 21, V (1, 1) = 15, ξ(1, 2) = 1, and ξ(1, 1) = 78 = 0.875. As Table 2 shows, the
equilibrium with random scrap values converges to the equilibrium in mixed strategies as ²
approaches zero. In the next section, we show that existence and convergence are general
properties of the game of incomplete information.
Computational issues. The advantage of studying a game of incomplete information is
that it eliminates the need for mixed entry/exit strategies without jeopardizing existence.
While the state space is effectively the same as in the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model, the
Bellman equation in the game of incomplete information has one additional term reflecting
how random scrap values/setup costs affect a firm’s per-period payoff. But, as demonstrated
in the above example, an appropriate distribution of the scrap values/setup costs yields a
closed-form expression for this term.14 Thus introducing incomplete information into the
Ericson & Pakes (1995) model adds essentially nothing to the computational burden and it
ensures that the search for an equilibrium is never hopeless because an equilibrium in cutoff
entry/exit strategies always exists. Below we first show that a slightly modified version
of the algorithm that Pakes & McGuire (1994) developed can be used to compute equilib-
ria of the game of incomplete information. Then we review the alternative of computing
mixed-strategy equilibria of the game of complete information and argue that the existing
algorithms are incapable of solving problems as large as the ones that arise in applications
of Ericson & Pakes’s (1995) framework.
Like Pakes & McGuire’s (1994) algorithm, the modified algorithm works iteratively.
14Besides the uniform distribution many others yield a closed-form expression, including triangular and
Beta distributions.
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² λ = 1 λ = 0.1 λ = 0.01 λ = 0.001 λ = 0.0001
10 87 457 3620 28416 207741
5 251 1256 9294 67105 421664
1 325 1610 13641 113229
0.1 1555 13092 107742
0.01 13092 107742
0.001 107742
Table 3: Number of iterations until convergence.
In the context of the above example the lth iteration takes a value function V l and a
policy function ξl as its input and outputs updated value and policy functions V l+1 and
ξl+1. Each iteration proceeds as follows: First, update the policy function by assigning
ξl+1(ω)← F ( φ¯(ω)−φ² ), where
φ¯(1, 2) = βV l(1, 2), (13)
φ¯(1, 1) = β
{
ξl(1, 1)V l(1, 1) + (1− ξl(1, 1))V l(1, 2)
}
. (14)
Second, update the value function by assigning
V l+1(ω)← pi(ω) + (1− ξl+1(ω))φ+ ²
∫
θ>F−1(ξl+1(ω))
θdF (θ) + ξl+1(ω)φ¯(ω),
where φ¯(ω) is as in equations (13) and (14) except that ξl(ω) is replaced by ξl+1(ω). The
algorithm terminates once the relative change in the value and the policy functions from
one iteration to the next is below a pre-specified tolerance. We take this tolerance to be
10−8 and use V 0 = 0 and ξ0 = 0 as starting values.
In the column labelled λ = 1 Table 3 lists the number of iterations until convergence.
The algorithm converges quickly if ² is large but fails to converge otherwise (indicated by
a blank). It turns out that adding a dampening scheme (see e.g. Chapter 3 of Judd 1998)
aids convergence. The dampening scheme combines the updated and the current policy
function with the assignment ξl+1(ω)← λF
(
φ¯(ω)−φ
²
)
+ (1− λ)ξl(ω) where λ ∈ (0, 1). The
remaining columns of Table 3 list the number of iterations until convergence for different
values of λ ∈ (0, 1). Roughly speaking, we are able to decrease ² by an order of magnitude
if we are willing to do the same with λ. This results in a tenfold increase in the number of
iterations.
Three conclusions emerge. First, the modified algorithm succeeds in computing an equi-
librium in cutoff entry/exit strategies. In sharp contrast, the original algorithm fails in cases
in which only an equilibrium in (nondegenerate) mixed strategies exists, for it can neither
exactly compute nor closely approximate such an equilibrium. Second, if random scrap
values/setup costs are deemed to be an accurate description of industry fundamentals, then
the modified algorithm converges quickly to an equilibrium in cutoff entry/exit strategies
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even if there is limited variation in the scrap values/setup costs. In the context of the above
example ² = 5 (² = 1) implies that the scrap value lies within ±33% (±7%) of its mean.15
Third, if, on the other hand, scrap values/setup costs are thought to be deterministic, then
the game of incomplete information may be useful to obtain an approximation to an equi-
librium in mixed entry/exit strategies of the game of complete information, although it
appears that the computational burden increases with the required accuracy.
The alternative to introducing incomplete information into the Ericson & Pakes (1995)
model is computing mixed-strategy equilibria of the game of complete information. In his
survey of the literature on dynamic stochastic games with discrete actions Breton (1991)
laments: “In the zero-sum case, there exist reasonably efficient algorithms, but such is not
the case in the general sum N -player case” (p. 56). Using a mathematical programming
approach he reports being able to solve, with considerable difficulty, dynamic stochastic
games with up to 3 players, 5 states, and 5 actions per player and state. Most recently,
Herings & Peeters (2004) have solved games with up to 5 players, 5 states, and 5 actions
per player and state. In its simplest form the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model reduces to a
dynamic entry/exit game. If there are N homogeneous firms, then the state of the industry
is defined by the number of active firms and |Ω| = N + 1. The state of the art algorithms
for dynamic stochastic games are thus able to compute an equilibrium in mixed entry/exit
strategies in industries with a handful of firms. If, on the other hand, firms are heterogenous
so that profits from product market competition depend on the identity of the active firms,
then the state of the industry indicates for each firm whether it is active or inactive. Hence,
|Ω| = 2N and computing an equilibrium in mixed entry/exit strategies in industries with
three firms pushes the limits of the best algorithms.
Of course, the real strength of Ericson & Pakes’s (1995) framework is that it allows us
to model dynamic competition between heterogeneous firms that decide on investment in
addition to entry and exit, thereby capturing the empirical finding that firm heterogeneity
evolves endogenously in response to random occurrences in the investment process. This
greatly increases the computational burden and puts most (if not all) applications out of
reach of the above algorithms. First, these algorithms are designed for discrete actions
whereas investment is continuous. The obvious solution is to discretize investment. This,
however, adds to the number of actions per firm and state, and even a fairly coarse dis-
cretization easily renders the problem intractable. Second, any sensible specification of
endogenously evolving firm heterogeneity requires more than just distinguishing between
active and inactive firms. In fact, all payoff-relevant characteristics of a firm have to be
encoded in its state. Consequently, the smallest applications of Ericson & Pakes’s (1995)
framework have hundreds and the largest ones millions of states (despite symmetry). The
sheer size of the state space alone makes these applications orders of magnitude too large
to be solvable with the best algorithms for computing mixed-strategy equilibria in dynamic
15In his study of the airframe industry Benkard (2004) assumes that the scrap value (setup cost) lies
within ±40% (±17%) of its mean.
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stochastic games.
In contrast, the algorithms suggested by Pakes & McGuire (1994, 2001) are capable of
solving such large games. The reason is that they are build around iterated best reply ideas.
That is, in a given state, the algorithm updates the decisions of one firm at a time (holding
the decisions of its rivals’ fixed), then it moves on to the next state. Best replies are easy to
calculate, often in closed-form. While this conveys a massive advantage to these algorithms,
the drawback is that they are confined to pure-strategy equilibria (which may not exist).16
Our use of incomplete information combines the best of both worlds, i.e., the computational
tractability of pure strategies with the theoretical soundness of mixed strategies. Indeed, as
we have argued above, incomplete information does not add to the computational burden
and yet it guarantees that an equilibrium in cutoff entry/exit strategies always exists. The
next section formally establishes this claim.
4 Existence and Convergence
In this section, we show how incorporating firm heterogeneity in the form of random scrap
values/setup costs into the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model guarantees the existence of an
equilibrium. We first establish the existence of a possibly asymmetric equilibrium. The
proof extends Whitt (1980) to our setting. In fact, for the most part, it is a reassembly of
his argument and some general results on dynamic programming due to Denardo (1967).
Both papers use models that are sufficiently abstract to enable us to construct the bulk of
the existence proof by citing their intermediate results. We then build on our basic exis-
tence result in three ways. We first show that a symmetric equilibrium exists. Requiring
the equilibrium to be symmetric is important because it reduces the computational burden
and forces heterogeneity to arise endogenously among ex ante identical firms. Second, we
show that, as the distribution of the random scrap values/setup costs becomes degenerate,
equilibria in cutoff entry/exit strategies converge to equilibria in mixed entry/exit strate-
gies of the game of complete information. Third, as a by-product, this last result implies
that there exists an equilibrium in the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model provided that mixed
entry/exit strategies are admissible.
16A fruitful venue for future research may be to abandon these iterated best reply ideas in favor of
computing the Nash equilibrium in one state at a time. The idea is that, in each state, firms play a static
game taking their value functions as given. This suggests an algorithm consisting of an outer loop that
searches for a fixed point in value functions and an inner loop that computes the Nash equilibrium in each
state. Govindan & Wilson (2003, 2004) compute mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in normal form games with
up to 6 players and 16 actions per player and up to 12 players and 14 actions per player, respectively, thus
leaving room to discretize investment, and report running times ranging from a few seconds to a few minutes.
Once these running times are multiplied by the number of states (inner loop) and the number of iterations
(outer loop), however, it is unclear whether the suggested algorithm is practical.
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4.1 Existence
We begin with a series of assumptions. The first one ensures that the model’s primitives
are bounded.
Assumption 1 (i) The state space is finite, i.e., N < ∞ and M < ∞. (ii) Profits are
bounded, i.e., there exists p¯i < ∞ such that −p¯i < pin(ω) < p¯i for all ω and all n. (iii)
Investments are bounded, i.e., x¯ < ∞ and x¯e < ∞. (iv) The distributions of scrap values
F (·) and setup costs F e(·) have continuous and positive densities and bounded supports,
i.e., there exist φ¯ <∞ and φ¯e <∞ such that the supports of F (·) and F e(·) are contained
in the interval [−φ¯, φ¯] and [−φ¯e, φ¯e], respectively. (v) Firms discount future payoffs, i.e.,
β ∈ [0, 1).
Next we assume continuity of firm n’s local income function hn(·). Similar continuity
assumptions are commonplace in the literature on dynamic stochastic games (see Mertens
2002).
Assumption 2 hn(ω, u(ω), Vn) is a continuous function of u(ω) and Vn for all ω and all
n.
Note that hn(·) is always continuous in Vn as long as Vn enters hn(·) via the expected value
of firm n’s future cash flows, E {Vn(ω′)|·}. Moreover, given that in our model formulation
current profit is additively separable from investment, continuity of hn(·) merely requires
continuity of the transition function P (·). We make the continuity assumption on hn(·)
rather than on P (·) to facilitate the adaptation of our existence proof to other models in
which current profit is not additively separable from investment.17
Due to the random scrap values/setup costs, our model is formally a dynamic stochastic
game with a finite state space and a continuum of actions given by the probability that
an incumbent firm remains in the industry/a potential entrant enters the industry and the
set of feasible investment choices. Under assumptions 1 and 2, standard arguments (e.g.,
Federgruen 1978, Whitt 1980) yield the existence of an equilibrium in mixed strategies.
However, computing mixed strategies over continuous actions is not practical. To guarantee
the existence of an equilibrium in cutoff entry/exit and pure investment strategies, we make
the additional assumption that firm n’s investment problem always has a unique solution.
Assumption 3 A unique xn(ω) exists that attains the maximum of hn(ω, 1, xn(ω), u−n(ω), Vn)
for all u−n(ω), Vn, ω, and all n.18
17In models of learning-by-doing (Cabral & Riordan 1994, Benkard 2004, Besanko, Doraszelski, Kryukov
& Satterthwaite 2007), for example, firms’ price or quantity decisions today determine their current profit
as well as their marginal cost of production tomorrow. Hence, the current profit of incumbent firm n is
pin(ω, x(ω)), where x(ω) = (x1(ω), . . . , xN (ω)) denotes the prices charged or the quantities marketed.
18Assumption 3 can be weakened to hold for all possible maximal return functions V ∗n,u−n ∈ [V ∗, V
∗
]|S|
rather than for all possible value functions Vn, where the loose upper and lower bounds are given by V
∗
=
φ¯e + p¯i
1−β + φ¯ and V
∗ = −φ¯e − p¯i
1−β − φ¯.
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In section 5 we define UIC admissibility of the transition function P (·) and prove that
this condition on the model’s primitives ensures uniqueness of investment choice and, thus,
existence of an equilibrium that is amenable to computation.
Recall that we assume entry and exit decisions are implemented before investment de-
cisions are carried out. Thus, firm n chooses xn(ω) to maximize hn(ω, 1, xn(ω), u−n(ω), Vn)
in accordance with equations (3) and (6), and the resulting investment choice also maxi-
mizes hn(ω, ξn(ω), xn(ω), u−n(ω), Vn) for all ξn(ω) > 0, u−n(ω), Vn, ω, and all n. Clearly
any investment would be optimal whenever an incumbent firm exits for sure or a po-
tential entrant stays out for sure. Consequently, we adopt the following convention: if
ξn(ω) = 0, then we take xn(ω) to have the value alluded to in assumption 3. It follows
that hn(ω, ξn(ω), xn(ω), u−n(ω), Vn) attains its maximum for a unique value of xn(ω) inde-
pendent of the value of ξn(ω). This is a natural convention because if there were even the
slightest chance that firm n would remain in the industry although it sets ξn(ω) = 0, then
the firm would want to choose this value of xn(ω) as its investment.
The above assumptions ensure existence of an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Under assumptions 1, 2, and 3, an equilibrium exists in cutoff entry/exit
and pure investment strategies.
The proof is based on the following idea.19 Fix strategies u−n and consider firm n’s
problem. Since its competitors’ strategies are fixed, firm n has to solve a decision problem
(as opposed to a game problem). We can thus employ dynamic programming techniques to
analyze the firm’s problem. In particular, a contraction mapping argument establishes that
the firm’s best reply to its competitors’ strategies is well-defined. It remains to show that
there exists a fixed point in the firms’ best-reply correspondences. From a computational
point of view, the proof mimics an algorithm that nests a dynamic programming problem
within a fixed point problem.20
Before stating the proof of proposition 1, we introduce and discuss a number of con-
structs that will also be useful in later parts of the paper. We start with the decision
problem. Let Vn denote the space of bounded |S| × 1 vectors with the sup norm and let ρ
denote the corresponding metric. Fix u−n ∈ U−n and define the maximal return operator
H∗n,u−n : Vn → Vn pointwise by
(H∗n,u−nVn)(ω) = sup
u˜n(ω)∈Un(ω)
hn(ω, u˜n(ω), u−n(ω), Vn).
The number (H∗u−nVn)(ω) represents the return to firm n in state ω when firm n chooses
its optimal action while the other firms use actions u−n(ω) and firm n’s future returns are
19Given that standard arguments (e.g., Federgruen 1978, Whitt 1980) establish the existence of an equi-
librium in mixed strategies, it actually suffices to show that a firm is never willing to mix. The reason that
we start from first principles is that we need the machinery from the proof of proposition 1 for the proofs of
propositions 3, 4, and 5.
20Such an algorithm has indeed been suggested by Rust (1994).
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described by Vn. Note that the RHS of the above equation coincides with the RHS of the
Bellman equation (9).
Since profits, investments, scrap values, and setup costs are bounded by assumption 1,
H∗n,u−n takes bounded vectors into bounded vectors. Application of Blackwell’s sufficient
conditions (monotonicity and discounting, see e.g. p. 54 of Stokey & Lucas (1989)) shows
that H∗n,u−n is a contraction with modulus β. The contraction mapping theorem (Stokey
& Lucas 1989, p. 50) therefore implies that there exists a unique V ∗n,u−n ∈ Vn that satisfies
V ∗n,u−n = H
∗
n,u−nV
∗
n,u−n or, equivalently,
V ∗n,u−n(ω) = sup
u˜n(ω)∈Un(ω)
hn(ω, u˜n(ω), u−n(ω), V ∗n,u−n) (15)
for all ω. The fixed point V ∗n,u−n of H
∗
n,u−n is called the maximal return function given
policies u−n; it should be thought of as a mapping from U−n into Vn. Clearly, given u−n,
the maximal return function V ∗n,u−n solves the Bellman equation (9); it plays a major role
in our existence proof.
Before proceeding to the existence proof, we introduce and discuss another operator.
Fix u ∈ U and define the return operator Hn,u : Vn → Vn pointwise by
(Hn,uVn)(ω) = hn(ω, u(ω), Vn).
The number (HuVn)(ω) represents the return to firm n in state ω when the firms use actions
u(ω) and Vn describes firm n’s future returns. Like H∗n,u−n , Hn,u is a contraction with
modulus β that takes bounded vectors into bounded vectors. Hence, a unique Vn,u ∈ Vn
exists that satisfies Vn,u = Hn,uVn,u, i.e.,
Vn,u(ω) = hn(ω, u(ω), Vn,u) (16)
for all ω. The fixed point Vn,u of Hn,u is called the return function given policies un; it
should be thought of as a mapping from U into Vn.
Note that there is a tight connection between the return function Vn,u and the maximal
return function V ∗n,u−n . In fact, because the return operator Hn,u is monotonic, theorem 3
of Denardo (1967) establishes that
V ∗n,u−n(ω) = sup
u˜n∈Un
Vn,u˜n,u−n(ω) (17)
for all ω, where Vn,u˜n,u−n is the fixed point of the return operator given policy (u˜n, u−n).
Put loosely, choosing one’s optimal response state by state yields the same return as choos-
ing ones optimal response jointly for all states. Somewhat more formally, the solution
to the Bellman equation (9) coincides with the solution to the (considerably more cum-
bersome) sequence form of the decision problem. To bring out the implications of equa-
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tion (17), fix strategies u−n and consider a family of games where each member of the
family is indexed by the initial state ω. Firm n’s best reply to u−n for the game begin-
ning in state ω yields a payoff of supu˜n∈Un Vn,u˜n,u−n(ω). But the maximal return func-
tion V ∗n,u−n is independent of the initial state and so is the strategy defined pointwise by
arg supu˜n(ω)∈Un(ω) hn(ω, u˜n(ω), u−n(ω), V
∗
n,u−n). Hence, the best reply can always be taken
to be independent of the initial state, a fact which we shall use presently.
With this machinery in place, we turn to the game problem. Consider the mapping
Υ : U → U defined pointwise by
Υn(u) =
{
u˜n ∈ Un : u˜n(ω) ∈ arg sup
u˜n(ω)∈Un(ω)
hn(ω, u˜n(ω), u−n(ω), V ∗n,u−n) for all ω
}
. (18)
Note that Υn(·) is the best-reply correspondence of firm n. An equilibrium exists if there
is a u ∈ U such that u ∈ Υ(u). To show that such a u exists, we show that Υ(·) is, in fact,
a continuous function to which Brouwer’s fixed point theorem applies.
Proof of proposition 1. We begin by establishing that Υ(·) is non-empty and
upper hemi-continuous. Given policies u−n, firm n’s maximal return function V ∗n,u−n is
well-defined due to assumption 1 as shown above. Fix ω. Assumption 2 states that firm
n’s local income function hn(ω, u(ω), Vn) is continuous in u(ω) and Vn. The maximand,
hn(ω, un(ω), u−n(ω), V ∗n,u−n), in the definition of Υn (·) is therefore continuous in un(ω) and
u−n if firm n’s maximal return function V ∗n,u−n is continuous in u−n. That this is so is
established through appeal to two lemmas by Whitt (1980).
His lemma 3.2 states that if Hn,uVn is continuous in u for all Vn, then the return function
Vn,u is continuous in u.21 This establishes that Vn,u is a continuous function of u. His lemma
3.1 states that if Un (ω), firm n’s set of feasible actions in state ω, is a compact metric space
for all ω, if the state space S is countable, and if the return function Vn,u is continuous in u,
then supu˜n∈Un Vn,u˜n,u−n (ω) is continuous in u−n for all ω. These requirements are satisfied.
Equation (17) thus implies that V ∗n,u−n (ω) is continuous in u−n for all ω. This, of course,
implies that firm n’s maximal return function V ∗n,u−n is continuous in u−n.
Since hn(ω, un(ω), u−n(ω), V ∗n,u−n) is continuous in un(ω) and u−n and Un(ω) is com-
pact and independent of u−n, the theorem of the maximum (see e.g. p. 62 of Stokey &
Lucas 1989) implies that arg supu˜n(ω)∈Un(ω) hn(ω, u˜n(ω), u−n(ω), V
∗
n,u−n) is non-empty and
upper hemi-continuous in u−n. Since ω was arbitrary, this establishes that Υn(·) is a
non-empty and upper hemi-continuous correspondence that maps U−n into Un. Hence,
Υ(·) = (Υ1(·), . . . ,ΥN (·)) is non-empty and upper hemi-continuous.
We next show that Υ(·) is single-valued. Fix ω. Recall that, given policies u−n, firm n’s
maximal return function V ∗n,u−n is well-defined and consider firm n’s best reply. Uniqueness
of the investment choice follows from assumption 3 and our convention covering the special
case of ξn(ω) = 0. This, in turn, implies that equations (3) and (6) give unique exit and
21We set Wn = Vn to obtain a special case of Whitt’s (1980) lemma.
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entry cutoffs, φ¯n(ω) and φ¯en(ω). Given that these cutoffs are unique, the corresponding exit
and entry probabilities, ξn(ω) = F (φ¯n(ω)) and ξen(ω) = F
e(φ¯en(ω)), must be unique. Since
ω was arbitrary, this establishes that Υn(·) and hence Υ(·) is single-valued.
Since Υ(·) is non-empty, single-valued, and upper hemi-continuous, it is, in fact, a con-
tinuous function that maps the non-empty, convex, and compact set U into itself. Brouwer’s
fixed point theorem therefore applies: a u ∈ U exists such that u ∈ Υ(u).
4.2 Symmetry
In section 4.1 we established the existence of a possibly asymmetric equilibrium. We now
show that if the model’s primitives satisfy an additional symmetry assumption, then a
symmetric equilibrium exists.
Informally the notion of symmetry in Ericson & Pakes (1995) is this: Consider an
industry with five firms and suppose that when firm 2 is in state 3 and the other four firms
are in states 1, 3, 3, and 6, then it invests 50. Symmetry means that when firm 4 is in
state 3 and the other four firms are in states 1, 3, 3, and 6, then it also invests 50. Thus,
in a symmetric equilibrium, a firm’s policy is a common function of its own state and the
distribution of its rivals’ states.
To formalize this notion of symmetry, let κ = (κ1, . . . , κN ) be a permutation of (1, . . . , N).
The policy functions u = (u1, . . . , uN ) are symmetric if
un(ωκ1 , . . . , ωκn−1 , ωκn , ωκn+1 , . . . ωκN ) = uκn(ω1, . . . , ωn−1, ωn, ωn+1, . . . ωN ) (19)
for all ω, n, and all κ. We say that an equilibrium is symmetric if its policy functions are
symmetric. Moreover, in a symmetric equilibrium the value functions V = (V1, . . . , VN ) are
symmetric and satisfy the analog of equation (19).
This definition implies two key properties that capture the essence of symmetry:
1. If the states of two firms are the same, then their actions must be the same. For
example, if ω = (2, 3, 3), then set κ = (2, 3, 1) in equation (19) to obtain u2(3, 3, 2) =
u2(ω2, ω3, ω1) = u3(ω1, ω2, ω3) = u3(2, 3, 3).
2. A firm does not care about the identity of its rivals; hence, the firm’s action must be the
same after its rivals’ exchange states. For example, if ω = (2, 3, 4), then set κ = (3, 2, 1)
in equation (19) to obtain u2(4, 3, 2) = u2(ω3, ω2, ω1) = u3(ω1, ω2, ω3) = u2(2, 3, 4).
Inspection shows that these properties imply the notion of symmetry in Ericson & Pakes
(1995): A firm’s policy is a function of its own state and the distribution of its rivals’ states.
One of the reasons symmetry is important is that it eases the computational burden
considerably. Instead of having to compute value and policy functions for all firms, under
symmetry it suffices to compute value and policy functions for one firm, say firm 1. To see
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this, let κ = (n, 2, . . . , n− 1, 1, n+ 1, . . . , N) in equation (19) to obtain
un(ωn, ω2, . . . , ωn−1, ω1, ωn+1, . . . , ωN ) = u1(ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn−1, ωn, ωn+1, . . . , ωN ), (20)
and similarly for the value function. That is, the value and policy of firm n is the same as
the value and policy of firm 1 had their states been interchanged. In addition, symmetry
reduces the size of the state space on which the value and policy functions of firm 1 are
defined because firm 1 does not care about the identity of its competitors. To see this, let
n = 1 and κ = (1, 2, . . . , k − 1, l, k + 1, . . . , l − 1, k, l + 1, . . . , N) with k ≥ 2 and l ≥ 2 in
equation (19) to obtain
u1(ω1, ω2, . . . , ωl, . . . , ωk, . . . , ωN ) = u1(ω1, ω2, . . . , ωk, . . . , ωl, . . . , ωN ), (21)
and similarly for the value function. That is, only the firm’s own state and the distribution
of rivals’ states matters. The latter property is commonly referred to as anonymity or as
exchangeability.22
We are now ready to state our symmetry assumption.
Assumption 4 The local income functions are symmetric, i.e.,
hn(ωκ1 , . . . , ωκN , uκ1(ω), . . . , uκN (ω), Vn) = hκn(ω1, . . . , ωN , u1(ω), . . . , uN (ω), Vκn) (22)
for all u(ω), symmetric V , ω, n and all κ.
Note that the value functions that enter the local income functions are themselves symmet-
ric.
Some further explanation may be helpful. A permutation κ shuﬄes firms’ states, actions,
and value functions in a way that preserves the values of their local income functions
according to the principle that identical actions in identical situations yield identical payoffs.
Let n = 2 and κ = (2, 3, 1) in equation (22) to obtain
h2(ω2, ω3, ω1, u2(ω), u3(ω), u1(ω), V2) = h3(ω1, ω2, ω3, u1(ω), u2(ω), u3(ω), V3).
On the left-hand side firm 2 is in state ω3 and takes action u3(ω) while it faces two rivals,
one in state ω1 and one in state ω2. On the right-hand side firm 3 is in state ω3 and takes
action u3(ω) while it faces two rivals, one in states ω1 and one in state ω2. Since the state
of firm 2 on the left-hand side is that of firm 3 on the right-hand side and the distribution
over states and actions of firm 2’s rivals on the left-hand side is that of firm 3’s rivals on
the right-hand side, their respective situations are identical.
22Equations (20) and (21) are often together taken as the definition of symmetry (e.g., Doraszelski &
Pakes 2007). It is easy to see that they are equivalent to our notion of symmetry in equation (19). Working
with equation (19) instead of equations (20) and (21) simplifies the notation in the remainder of this section.
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While we have stated assumption 4 in terms of the local income functions to facilitate
the adaptation of our existence proof to other models, it is readily tied to the model’s
primitives.
Proposition 2 Assumption 4 is satisfied provided that (i) the profit functions are symmet-
ric, i.e.,
pin(ωκ1 , . . . , ωκN ) = piκn(ω1, . . . , ωN )
for all ω, n and all κ and (ii) the transition function is symmetric, i.e.,
P (ω′κ1 , . . . , ω
′
κN
, ωκ1 , . . . , ωκN , χκ1(ω, φκ1), . . . , χκN (ω, φκN ), xκ1(ω), . . . , xκN (ω))
= P (ω′1, . . . , ω
′
N , ω1, . . . , ωN , χ1(ω, φ1), . . . , χN (ω, φN ), x1(ω), . . . , xN (ω))
for all χ(ω, φ), x(ω), ω′, ω and all κ.
The proof of proposition 2 is straightforward but tedious and therefore omitted. Note that
in the special case of independent transitions, condition (ii) of proposition 2 is satisfied
whenever the factors Pn(·) of the transition function P (·) are the same across firms, i.e.,
Pn(ω′n, ωn, χn(ω, φn), xn(ω)) = P1(ω′n, ωn, χn(ω, φn), xn(ω)) for all n.
Together with assumptions 1, 2, and 3 in section 4.1, assumption 4 ensures existence of
a symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Under assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, a symmetric equilibrium exists in cutoff
entry/exit and pure investment strategies.
The idea of the proof is as follows. Symmetry allows us to restrict attention to the
best-reply correspondence of firm 1. To enforce the anonymity that symmetry implies we
redefine the state space employing the Ericson-Pakes notion that symmetry means each
firm’s investment is a common function of its own state and the distribution of its rivals’
states. This reduced state space makes it impossible for firm 1 to tailor its policy to the
identity of its competitors. An argument analogous to the proof of proposition 1 shows
that there exists a fixed point to the best-reply correspondence of firm 1. We use this fixed
point to construct a candidate equilibrium by specifying symmetric policies for all firms.
The associated value functions are also symmetric. Finally, to complete the argument, we
exploit the symmetry of the local income functions to show that no firm has an incentive
to deviate from the candidate equilibrium.
In preparation for proving proposition 3 we introduce the necessary notation to construct
the candidate equilibrium. To understand our notation, it is helpful to keep in mind that
the candidate equilibrium will be symmetric. We begin with defining the reduced state
space. Consider firm n and state ω. Define σn = (σn,1, . . . , σn,M , σn,M+1), where σn,m
denotes the number of competitors of firm n that are in state m (excluding firm n), and
Σ =
{
σn ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}M+1|
∑M+1
m=1 σn,m = N − 1
}
to be the set of values that σn can
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take on. Rewrite ω as (ωn, σn). Let S◦ = Ω×Σ denote the reduced state space and S = ΩN
the full state space. Define a function τn : S → S◦ such that τn(ω) = (ωn, σn); it maps
the full to the reduced state space. For example, if N = 4, M = 3, and ω = (3, 2, 2, 4),
then (ω1, σ1) = τ1(ω) = (3, 0, 2, 0, 1) and (ω3, σ3) = τ3(ω) = (2, 0, 1, 1, 1). Note that no
information is lost in going from the full to the reduced state space provided that the
equilibrium is symmetric. In particular, τ1(ω) contains all the information in ω that is
required to evaluate the value and policy functions of firm 1. Note also that in general
the reduced state space is considerably smaller than the full state space: it has just |S◦| =
(M + 1)
(
M+N−1N−1
)
< (M + 1)N = |S| states.23
Define the inverse function τ−1n : S◦ → S such that ω = τ−1n (ωn, σn) is a fixed selec-
tion from the set {ω|(ωn, σn) = τn(ω)}. We adopt the convention that ω = τ−1n (ωn, σn)
satisfies ω1 ≤ ω2 ≤ . . . ≤ ωn−1 ≤ ωn+1 ≤ . . . ≤ ωN . Observe that, if ωˆ = τ−1n (τn(ω)),
then ωˆ is obtained from ω by rearranging the elements of ω−n. For example, (3, 2, 2, 5) =
τ−11 (τ1(3, 2, 5, 2)), (2, 2, 3, 5) = τ
−1
2 (τ2(3, 2, 5, 2)), etc. A state ωˇ is called canonical if and
only if ωˇ = τ−11 (ωˇ1, σ1) for some (ωˇ1, σ1). We use the symbol ˇ to distinguish canonical
states in the remainder of this section.
Next we redefine actions, strategies, and payoffs on the reduced state space. We use the
symbol ◦ to distinguish objects defined on the reduced state space from the corresponding
objects defined on the full state space. For example, we write u◦1(ω1, σ1) ∈ U◦1 (ω1, σ1) instead
of u1(ω) ∈ U1(ω), where U◦1 (ω1, σ1) = U1(τ−11 (ω1, σ1)) because U1(ω) merely hinges on ω1
(see equation 8). By construction a strategy u◦1 = ×(ω1,σ1)∈S◦u◦1(ω1, σ1) ∈ ×(ω1,σ1)∈S◦U◦1 (ω1, σ1) =
U◦1 defined on the reduced state space satisfies anonymity. Consequently, in terms of the
reduced state space, a symmetric equilibrium is one in which all firms use the same strategy,
i.e., u◦n(ωn, σn) = u◦1(ωn, σn) for all ωn and all σn. Turning to payoffs, we take the local
income function of firm 1 on the reduced state space to be
h◦1((ω1, σ1), u
◦
1(ω1, σ1), u
◦
2(τ2(τ
−1
1 (ω1, σ1))), . . . , u
◦
N (τN (τ
−1
1 (ω1, σ1))), V
◦
1 )
= h1(τ−11 (ω1, σ1), u
◦
1(ω1, σ1), u
◦
2(τ2(τ
−1
1 (ω1, σ1))), . . . , u
◦
N (τN (τ
−1
1 (ω1, σ1))),Λ1(V
◦
1 )), (23)
where Λn maps firm 1’s value (or policy) function, V ◦1 , defined on the reduced state space to
firm n’s value (or policy) function, Vn, defined on the full state space. That is, the mapping
Λn is defined such that Vn = Λn(V ◦1 ) if and only if
Vn(ω) = V ◦1 (τn(ω))
for all ω.
This notation permits us to define the best-reply correspondence for firm 1 and to
construct the candidate equilibrium. Define the maximal return operator H◦∗1,u◦1 : V
◦
1 → V◦1
23Gowrisankaran (1999b) develops an algorithm for the efficient representation of the reduced state space.
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pointwise by
(H◦∗1,u◦1V
◦
1 )(ω1, σ1) = sup
u˜◦1(ω1,σ1)∈U◦1 (ω1,σ1)
h◦1((ω1, σ1), u˜
◦
1(ω1, σ1),
u◦1(τ2(τ
−1
1 (ω1, σ1))), . . . , u
◦
1(τN (τ
−1
1 (ω1, σ1))), V
◦
1 ),
where, to enforce symmetry, we take all rivals of firm 1 to use the same strategy, namely
u◦1. The maximal return function V ◦∗1,u◦1 satisfies V
◦∗
1,u◦1
= H◦∗1,u◦1V
◦∗
1,u◦1
. It is well-defined and
continuous in u◦1 as in the proof of proposition 1. Note that there is no circularity involved in
the construction of V ◦∗1,u◦1 because u
◦
1 is taken as given. Define the best-reply correspondence
Υ◦1 : U◦1 → U◦1 by
Υ◦1(u
◦
1) =
{
u˜◦1 ∈ U◦1 : u˜◦1(ω1, σ1) ∈ arg sup
u˜◦1(ω1,σ1)∈U◦1 (ω1,σ1)
h◦1((ω1, σ1), u˜
◦
1(ω1, σ1),
u◦1(τ2(τ
−1
1 (ω1, σ1))), . . . , u
◦
1(τN (τ
−1
1 (ω1, σ1))), V
◦∗
1,u◦1
) for all (ω1, σ1)
}
. (24)
Under assumptions 1, 2, and 3, a u◦1 ∈ U◦1 exists such that u◦1 ∈ Υ◦1(u◦1). To see this
note that, as in the proof of proposition 1, Υ◦1(·) is non-empty, single-valued, and upper
hemi-continuous and thus a function to which Brouwer’s fixed point theorem applies.
Construct a candidate equilibrium by using u◦1 to define firm n’s policy function on the
full state space to be
un = Λn(u◦1). (25)
Turning from the equilibrium policy functions to the corresponding value functions, similarly
define firm n’s value function on the full state space to be
V ∗n,u−n = Λn(V
◦∗
1,u◦1
). (26)
By construction, the above value and policy functions are symmetric.
It remains to show that no firm has an incentive to deviate from the candidate equilib-
rium that, by construction, is symmetric. Specifically, we show that even if we allowed a
firm to tailor its policy to the identity of its competitors (as it is always free to do in the
original state space and perhaps also in reality), the firm has no incentive to do so. This
justifies the common practice of computing equilibria directly on the reduced state space.
Proof of proposition 3. The proof has three steps. The first step is to show that the
problem of firm n in state ω is identical to the problem of firm 1 in state ωˆ that is obtained
by switching the first with the nth element of ω. Equation (8) implies Un(ω) = U1(ωˆ) so
that the set of feasible actions of firm n in state ω is the same as that of firm 1 in state ωˆ.
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Moreover, for an arbitrary action u˜n(ω) ∈ Un(ω) we have
hn(ω, u1(ω), u2(ω), . . . , un−1(ω), u˜n(ω), un+1(ω), . . . , uN (ω), V ∗n,u−n)
= h1(ωˆ, u˜n(ω), u2(ω), . . . , un−1(ω), u1(ω), un+1(ω), . . . , uN (ω), V ∗1,u−1)
= h1(ωˆ, u˜n(ω), u2(ωˆ), . . . , un−1(ωˆ), un(ωˆ), un+1(ωˆ), . . . , uN (ωˆ), V ∗1,u−1),
where the first equality follows from the symmetry of the value and local income functions
and the second from the symmetry of the policy functions. Hence, the local income function
of firm n in state ω is the same as that of firm 1 in state ωˆ.
The second step is to show that the problem of firm 1 in the (possibly) non-canonical
state ωˆ is identical to the problem of firm 1 in the canonical state ωˇ that is obtained from ωˆ
by rearranging the elements of ωˆ−1. Formally, ωˇ1 = ωˆ1 and ωˇn = ωˆκn for some permutation
κ−1 = (κ2, . . . , κN ) of (2, . . . , N). We have U1(ωˆ) = U1(ωˇ) for the set of feasible actions
and, for an arbitrary action u˜1(ωˆ) ∈ U1(ωˆ),
h1(ωˆ, u˜1(ωˆ), u2(ωˆ), . . . , uN (ωˆ), V ∗1,u−1)
= h1(ωˇ, u˜1(ωˆ), uκ2(ωˆ), . . . , uκN (ωˆ), V
∗
1,u−1)
= h1(ωˇ, u˜1(ωˆ), u2(ωˇ), . . . , uN (ωˇ), V ∗1,u−1),
where the first equality follows from the symmetry of the value and local income functions
and the second from the symmetry of the policy functions.
The third and final step is to show that firm 1 in the canonical state ωˇ has no incentive
to deviate from the candidate equilibrium. For an arbitrary action u˜1(ωˇ) ∈ U1(ωˇ) we have
h1(ωˇ, u˜1(ωˇ), u2(ωˇ), . . . , uN (ωˇ), V ∗1,u−1)
= h1(ωˇ, u˜1(ωˇ), u◦1(τ2(ωˇ)), . . . , u
◦
1(τN (ωˇ)),Λ1(V
◦∗
1,u◦1
))
= h1(τ−11 (ωˇ1, σ1), u˜1(ωˇ), u
◦
1(τ2(τ
−1
1 (ωˇ1, σ1))), . . . , u
◦
1(τN (τ
−1
1 (ωˇ1, σ1))),Λ1(V
◦∗
1,u◦1
))
= h◦1((ωˇ1, σ1), u˜1(ωˇ), u
◦
1(τ2(τ
−1
1 (ωˇ1, σ1))), . . . , u
◦
1(τN (τ
−1
1 (ωˇ1, σ1))), V
◦∗
1,u◦1
), (27)
where the first equality follows from equations (25) and (26), the second from the fact
that ωˇ = τ−1(ωˇ1, σ1) for some (ωˇ1, σ1) because ωˇ is canonical, and the last from equation
(23). Moreover, we have U1(ωˇ) = U1(τ−11 (ωˇ1, σ1)) = U◦1 (ωˇ1, σ1) for the set of feasible
actions. Since the last line of equation (27) is the maximand of firm 1 in the best-reply
correspondence in equation (24), firm 1 has no incentive to deviate. Moreover, since the
problem of firm n in state ω is identical to the problem of firm 1 in state ωˇ by the first two
steps of the proof, no firm has an incentive to deviate from the candidate equilibrium.
33
4.3 Convergence to Equilibria in Mixed Strategies
In this section we relate our game with random scrap values/setup costs to the game of
complete information. To do so, we write firm n’s scrap value as φ + ²θn if ωn 6= M + 1
and its setup cost as φe + ²θen if ωn = M + 1, where ² > 0 is a constant scale factor that
measures the importance of incomplete information. Overloading notation, we assume that
θn ∼ F (·) and θen ∼ F e(·) with E (θn) = E (θen) = 0.
Firm n’s return or local income function h²n(·) becomes
h²n(ω, un(ω), Vn)
=

pin(ω) + (1− ξn(ω))φ+ ²
∫
θn>F−1(ξn(ω)) θndF (θn)
+ξn(ω)
{
− xn(ω) + βE {Vn(ω′)|ω, ω′n 6=M + 1, ξ−n(ω), x(ω)}
}
if ωn 6=M + 1,
−² ∫θen<F e−1(ξn(ω)) θendF e(θen)
+ξn(ω)
{
− φe − xn(ω) + βE {Vn(ω′)|ω, ω′n 6=M + 1, ξ−n(ω), x(ω)}
}
if ωn =M + 1,
where ξn(ω) =
∫
χn(ω, θn)dF (θn) =
∫
1(φ+ ²θn < φ¯n(ω))dF (θn) = F
(
φ¯n(ω)−φ
²
)
, etc.
Proposition 1 in section 4.1 guarantees the existence of an equilibrium in cutoff en-
try/exit and pure investment strategies for any fixed ² > 0. Note that h0n(·) is the local
income function that obtains in a game of complete information. As we have already pointed
out, there is a need to allow for mixed entry/exit strategies in a game with deterministic
scrap values/setup costs such as Ericson & Pakes (1995). We thus ask if the equilibrium
of the game of incomplete information converges to the equilibrium in mixed entry/exit
strategies as ² approaches zero. The following proposition gives an affirmative answer.
Proposition 4 Suppose assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold and consider a sequence {²l} such
that liml→∞ ²l = 0. Let {ul} be a corresponding sequence of equilibria in cutoff entry/exit
strategies such that liml→∞ ul = u. Then u is an equilibrium in mixed entry/exit strategies.
Proof. Let {V ²l
ul
} be the corresponding sequence of return functions where V ²l
n,ul
satisfies
V ²
l
n,ul
= H²
l
n,ul
V ²
l
n,ul
. Repeating the argument that led to equation (16) in section 4.1 shows
that each element of {V ²l
ul
} is well-defined due to assumption 1. Moreover, since H²n,uVn is
continuous in ² and u for all Vn, lemma 3.2 of Whitt (1980) implies that the return function
V ²n,u is continuous in ² and u. Let Vn,u = liml→∞ V ²
l
n,ul
for all n.
The proof proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we verify that the limiting strategies
un are optimal given the return function Vn,u for all n. In the second step, we verify that
the return function Vn,u coincides with the maximal return function for all n.
Suppose un(ω) 6∈ arg supu˜n(ω)∈Un(ω) h0n(ω, u˜n(ω), u−n(ω), Vn,u) for some ω and some n.
Then there exists u˜n(ω) ∈ Un(ω) such that
h0n(ω, u˜n(ω), u−n(ω), Vn,u) > h
0
n(ω, un(ω), u−n(ω), Vn,u).
34
Since h²n(ω, u(ω), Vn,u) is a continuous function of ², u(ω), and Vn,u, there exists L large
enough such that
h²
l
n (ω, u˜n(ω), u
l
−n(ω), V
²l
n,ul) > h
²l
n (ω, u
l
n(ω), u
l
−n(ω), V
²l
n,ul)
for all l ≥ L. Hence, uln(ω) 6∈ arg supu˜n(ω)∈Un(ω) h²
l
n (ω, u˜n(ω), u
l−n(ω), V ²
l
n,ul
) and we obtain
a contradiction.
It remains to verify that the return function Vn,u coincides with the maximal return
function for all n. By construction V ²
l
n,ul
satisfies V ²
l
n,ul
(ω) = h²
l
n (ω, u
l(ω), V ²
l
n,ul
) for all ω.
Taking limits on both sides shows that Vn,u satisfies Vn,u(ω) = h0n(ω, u(ω), Vn,u) for all ω.
Using the first step of the proof, we have
Vn,u(ω) = h0n(ω, u(ω), Vn,u) = sup
u˜n(ω)∈Un(ω)
h0n(ω, u˜n(ω), u−n(ω), Vn,u)
for all ω. Since Vn,u is a fixed point of the maximal return operator of the game of complete
information, it is the maximal return function.
Note that proposition 4 does not imply that liml→∞ ul exists. On the other hand, since
U is compact every sequence {ul} has a convergent subsequence, and proposition 4 applies
to the subsequential limit. This establishes
Corollary 1 Under assumptions 1, 2, and 3, an equilibrium exists in mixed entry/exit and
pure investment strategies in the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model.
5 A Sufficient Condition for Pure Investment Strategies
Assumption 3 requires that the local income function hn(ω, 1, xn(ω), u−n(ω), Vn) is max-
imized at a unique investment choice xn(ω) for all u−n(ω), Vn, ω, and all n. This is
restrictive because, in general, the value function Vn of firm n and the actions u−n(ω) of its
rivals may take on values such that hn(. . . , 1, xn(ω), . . .) attains its maximum at more than
one investment level. To see the role assumption 3 plays, suppose for the moment that it
is violated. Then Υn(·), the best-reply correspondence of firm n, is no longer guaranteed
to be a function, thus necessitating the use of Kakutani’s instead of Brouwer’s fixed point
theorem. Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, in turn, requires convex-valuedness of Υn(·).
Using standard arguments, convex-valuedness can be ensured by allowing for mixed invest-
ment strategies. This, however, is not practical because computing mixed strategies over
continuous actions is well beyond present computational capabilities.
Fortunately, a judicious choice of transition probabilities guarantees that the investment
choice is unique. In this section we define unique investment choice (UIC) admissibility
of the transition function P (·) and show in proposition 5 that if this condition on the
model’s primitives is satisfied, then an equilibrium in cutoff entry/exit and pure investment
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strategies exists. We then give a series of examples of transition functions that are UIC
admissible and provide a reasonable amount of flexibility.
Condition 1 The transition function P (·) is unique investment choice (UIC) admissible
if, for all χ−n(ω, φ−n), x(ω), ω′, ω, and all n, the probability P (ω′, ω, 1, χ−n(ω, φ−n), x(ω))
that the industry moves from state ω to state ω′ given that firm n remains in the industry
(or enters the industry if firm n is an entrant rather than an incumbent) can be written in
a separable form as
Kn
(
ω′, ω, χ−n (ω, φ−n) , x−n(ω)
)
Qn(ω, xn (ω)) + Ln
(
ω′, ω, χ−n (ω, φ−n) , x−n(ω)
)
, (28)
where Qn(ω, x (ω)) is twice differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave in xn(ω),
i.e.,
d
dxn(ω)
Qn(ω, xn (ω)) > 0,
d2
dxn(ω)2
Qn(ω, xn (ω)) < 0 (29)
for all xn(ω) ∈ [0, x¯] (or xn(ω) ∈ [0, x¯e] if firm n is an entrant rather than an incumbent).24
UIC admissibility ensures that firm n’s local income function hn(. . . , 1, xn(ω), . . .) either
is strictly concave—and therefore has a unique maximizer—in the interval [0, x¯] (or in
the interval [0, x¯e] if firm n is an entrant rather than an incumbent) or that the unique
maximizer is a corner solution.25 We are now ready to state our main result establishing
that a computationally tractable equilibrium exists in our model.
Proposition 5 Suppose assumptions 1 and 2 hold. If the transition function P (·) is UIC
admissible, then an equilibrium exists in cutoff entry/exit and pure investment strategies.
If in addition assumption 4 holds, then a symmetric equilibrium exists in cutoff entry/exit
and pure investment strategies.
Proof. In light of propositions 1 and 3, it suffices to show that assumption 3 holds.
Since the proof for a potential entrant is the same with x¯e replacing x¯, we focus on the
investment problem of an incumbent firm in what follows.
UIC admissibility ensures that the expected value of firm n’s future cash flow, E {Vn(ω′)|ω, ω′n 6=
M + 1, ξ−n(ω), x(ω)}, in its local income function hn(. . . , 1, xn(ω), . . .) can be written in a
separable form as
An(ω, u−n(ω), Vn)Qn(ω, xn(ω)) +Bn(ω, u−n(ω), Vn). (30)
To see this, recall from equation (1) that firm n has to “integrate out” over all possible
realizations of its rivals’ exit and entry decisions to obtain the probability that the industry
24Condition 1 can be generalized to allow for Q(·) to depend on x−n(ω).
25Of course, uniqueness of investment choice can also be achieved by other means. In particular, if x¯e = 0,
then a potential entrant has no choice but to invest zero, thereby stripping the potential entrant of any
control over its initial position within the industry (as in Ericson & Pakes 1995).
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moves from state ω to state ω′. Hence,∑
ω′∈S
Vn(ω′)
∑
ι−n∈{0,1}N−1
P (ω′, ω, 1, ι−n, x(ω))
∏
k 6=n
ξk(ω)ιk(1− ξk(ω))1−ιk
=
∑
ω′∈S
Vn(ω′)
∑
ι−n∈{0,1}N−1
[
Kn
(
ω′, ω, ι−n, x−n(ω)
)
Qn(ω, xn (ω)) + Ln
(
ω′, ω, ι−n, x−n(ω)
) ]
×
∏
k 6=n
ξk(ω)ιk(1− ξk(ω))1−ιk
=
[ ∑
ω′∈S
Vn(ω′)
∑
ι−n∈{0,1}N−1
Kn
(
ω′, ω, ι−n, x−n(ω)
) ∏
k 6=n
ξk(ω)ιk(1− ξk(ω))1−ιk
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
An(ω,u−n(ω),Vn)
Qn(ω, xn(ω))
+
[ ∑
ω′∈S
Vn(ω′)
∑
ι−n∈{0,1}N−1
Ln
(
ω′, ω, ι−n, x−n(ω)
) ∏
k 6=n
ξk(ω)ιk(1− ξk(ω))1−ιk
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bn(ω,u−n(ω),Vn)
where the first equality uses the separability condition (28).
Next we differentiate hn(. . . , 1, xn(ω), . . .) with respect to xn(ω). By virtue of equation
(30), the FOC for an unconstrained solution to firm n’s investment problem is
−1 + βAn(ω, u−n(ω), Vn) d
dxn(ω)
Qn(ω, xn (ω)) = 0.
There are two cases to consider. First suppose that An(ω, u−n(ω), Vn) > 0. If there
exists a solution to the FOC in [0, x¯], say xˆn(ω), then it must be unique because the
objective function is strictly concave on [0, x¯] in light of the derivative condition (29).
Hence, xn(ω) = xˆn(ω) is the unique maximizer. If there does not exist a solution to the
FOC in [0, x¯], then the objective function is either strictly decreasing or strictly increasing
on [0, x¯]. In the former case the unique maximizer is xn(ω) = 0 and in the latter case it is
xn(ω) = x¯.
Next suppose that An(ω, u−n(ω), Vn) ≤ 0. The objective function is strictly decreasing.
Hence, the unique maximizer is xn(ω) = 0.
UIC admissibility allows for much more flexibility in the transition probabilities than
the simple schemes seen in the extant literature where each firm is restricted to each period
move up one state, stay the same, or drop down one state. We demonstrate this with a
series of increasingly complex examples all involving an industry with N = 2 firms, M ≥ 3
“active” states, and no entry and exit.
Example: Independent transitions to immediately adjacent states. Consider a
game of capacity accumulation (see Besanko & Doraszelski 2004) where a firm’s state de-
scribes its capacity. In each period, the firm decides how much to spend on an investment
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ω′2 = ω2 + 1 ω
′
2 = ω2 ω
′
2 = ω2 − 1
ω′1 = ω1 + 1 (1− δ)p1(1− δ)p2 (1− δ)p1[δp2 + (1− δ)(1− p2)] (1− δ)p1δp2
ω′1 = ω1
[δp1 + (1− δ)(1− p1)]
×(1− δ)p2
[δp1 + (1− δ)(1− p1)]
×[δp2 + (1− δ)(1− p2)]
[δp1 + (1− δ)(1− p1)]
×δp2
ω′1 = ω1 − 1 δ(1− p1)(1− δ)p2 δ(1− p1)[δp2 + (1− δ)(1− p2)] δ(1− p1)δp2
Table 4: Transition probabilities. Independent transitions to immediately adjacent states.
project in order to add to its capacity. If firm n invests xn(ω) ≥ 0, then the probability
that its investment project succeeds is
pn =
αxn(ω)
1 + αxn(ω)
,
where the parameter α > 0 measures the effectiveness of investment. Depreciation tends to
offset investment, and we assume that each firm is independently hit by a depreciation shock
with probability δ. The transition probabilities at an interior state ω ∈ {2, . . . ,M − 1}2 are
given in Table 4.26
Without loss of generality, consider firm 1. The probability of remaining in state ω can
be written as
[δp1 + (1− δ)(1− p1)][δp2 + (1− δ)(1− p2)]
= [2δ − 1][δp2 + (1− δ)(1− p2)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
K1(ω,ω,x2(ω))
p1︸︷︷︸
Q1(ω,x1(ω))
+ [1− δ][δp2 + (1− δ)(1− p2)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
L1(ω,ω,x2(ω))
.
This expression satisfies the separability condition (28), as do the corresponding expressions
for the probabilities of moving to some other state ω′ 6= ω. In addition, the derivative
condition (29) is satisfied because
d
dx1(ω)
Q1(ω, x1(ω)) =
α
(1 + αx1(ω))2
> 0,
d2
dx1(ω)2
Q1(ω, x1(ω)) = − 2α
2
(1 + αx1(ω))3
< 0.
Example: Dependent transitions to immediately adjacent states. Next we intro-
duce correlation into firms’ transitions by replacing the firm-specific depreciation shocks of
the above example by an industry-wide depreciation shock (e.g., Pakes & McGuire 1994).
Decompose, for purposes of exposition, the transition of each firm into two stages. In the
first stage the probability that firm n’s state increases by one is again given by pn. In the
second stage a depreciation shock reduces the states of all firms by one with probability δ.
The transition probabilities at an interior state ω ∈ {2, . . . ,M − 1}2 are given in Table 5.
26Edge states must be treated specially. If ωn = 1, then the probability of moving up to state ω
′
n = 2
(remaining in state ω′n = 1) is (1 − δ)pn (δpn); if ωn = M , then the probability of dropping down to state
ω′n =M − 1 (remaining in state ω′n =M) is δ(1− pn) (1− δ(1− pn)).
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ω′2 = ω2 + 1 ω′2 = ω2 ω′2 = ω2 − 1
ω′1 = ω1 + 1 (1− δ) p1p2 (1− δ) p1 (1− p2) 0
ω′1 = ω1 (1− δ) (1− p1) p2 (1− δ) (1− p1) (1− p2) + δp1p2 δp1 (1− p2)
ω′1 = ω1 − 1 0 δ (1− p1) p2 δ (1− p1) (1− p2)
Table 5: Transition probabilities. Dependent transitions to immediately adjacent states.
For the sake of brevity, we just spell out the probability of remaining in state ω,
(1− δ)(1− p1)(1− p2) + δp1p2 = [δ − 1 + p2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
K1(ω,ω,x2(ω))
p1︸︷︷︸
Q1(ω,x1(ω))
+ [(1− δ)(1− p2)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
L1(ω,ω,x2(ω))
,
and note that conditions (28) and (29) are again both satisfied.
Example: Dependent transitions to arbitrary states. Using the above two-stage
decomposition much more flexible transitions can be constructed. In the first stage firm
n’s investment xn(ω) determines a set of transition probabilities to all possible active firm
states. For example, the probability that firm n moves from its initial state ωn to the
intermediate state ωˆn ∈ {1, . . . ,M} may be
ζn,ωn,1 + ηn,ωn,1 pn if ωˆn = 1,
...
...
...
ζn,ωn,ωn−1 + ηn,ωn,ωn−1 pn if ωˆn = ωn − 1,
ζn,ωn,ωn + ηn,ωn,ωn pn if ωˆn = ωn,
ζn,ωn,ωn+1 + ηn,ωn,ωn+1 pn if ωˆn = ωn + 1,
...
...
...
ζn,ωn,M + ηn,ωn,M pn if ωˆn =M,
where xn(ω) affects the probability of a transition from state ωn to state ωˆn either positively
of negatively depending on the sign of ηn,ωn,ωˆn .
27 In the second stage, the industry transits
from its intermediate state ωˆ to its final state ω′ according to some arbitrary, exogenously
given probabilities that may depend on ωˆ.
Clearly, pn does not have to equal
αxn(ω)
1+αxn(ω)
; it can be of any form that satisfies the
derivative condition (29). For example, let
pn = 1− e−αxn(ω),
27The parameters ζn,ωn,ωˆn and ηn,ωn,ωˆn must be chosen to ensure that the probabilities stay in the
unit interval for all xn(ω) ∈ [0, x¯] and sum to one. In particular, this requires ∑Mωˆn=1 ζn,ωn,ωˆn = 1 and∑M
ωˆn=1
ηn,ωn,ωˆn = 0.
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where α > 0. As another example, let
pn =
arctan
(
2α1xn(ω)+α2√
4−α22
)
− arctan
(
α2√
4−α22
)
pi
2 − arctan
(
α2√
4−α22
) ,
where α1 > 0 and 0 ≤ α2 < 2. Then pn is increasing in α1 (just as αxn(ω)1+αxn(ω) and 1− eαxn(ω)
are increasing in α) and increasing (decreasing) in α2 to the left (right) of xn(ω) = 1α1 . That
is, while increasing α1 makes investments of all sizes more effective, increasing α2 makes
small investments more and large ones less effective. In addition, xn(ω) = 1α1 implies pn =
1
2 .
Hence, increasing α2 preserves the median but increases the spread of pn as measured, e.g.,
by the inter-quartile range.
6 Multiplicity
It is widely believed that multiplicity is not an issue in Ericson & Pakes’s (1995) framework.
Pakes (2000) summarizes his experience as follows:
... we have experimented quite a bit with the core version of the algorithm, and
we never found two sets of equilibrium policies for a given set of primitives (we
frequently run the algorithm several times using different initial conditions or
different orderings of points looking for other equilibria that might exist). We
should emphasize here that the core version, and indeed most other versions
that have been used, all use quite simple functional forms for the primitives of
the problem, and multiplicity of equilibrium may well be more likely when more
complicated functional forms are used. Of course, most applied work suffices
with quite simple functional forms. (pp. 18–19)
In this section we discuss three examples that show that there need not be a unique
equilibrium that is symmetric. Our goal here is solely to establish the possibility of multiple
equilibria. Throughout we use the “quite simple functional forms” alluded to by Pakes
(2000). Using more complicated functional forms in a model of learning-by-doing, Besanko
et al. (2006) find as many as nine equilibria for some parameterizations and discuss the
economics underlying this multiplicity.
Example: Investment decisions. We build on the game of capacity accumulation from
section 5. There are N = 2 firms with M ≥ 3 “active” states. In state ωn firm n’s capacity
is q¯ωn . Transitions are limited to immediately adjacent states and are independent across
firms.28 Products are undifferentiated and firms compete in prices subject to capacity
28Because the transition function P (·) is UIC admissible, it is guaranteed that multiplicity is not due to
a violation of assumption 3.
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parameter M q¯1 q¯2 . . . q¯10 v m α δ β
value 10 0 5 . . . 45 1 40 2.375 0.03 2021
Table 6: Parameter values.
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Figure 1: Two equilibria.
constraints. There arem identical consumers with unit demand and reservation price v. The
equilibrium of this Bertrand-Edgeworth product market game is characterized in Chapter
2 of Ghemawat (1997). Let pi(ω1, ω2) denote firm 1’s current profit in state ω = (ω1, ω2).
Symmetry implies that firm 2’s current profit in state ω is pi(ω2, ω1). Table 6 gives the
parameter values.
Figure 1 illustrates the value and policy functions of two symmetric equilibria. In both
investment activity is greatest in states on or near the diagonal of the state space. That
is, firms with equal or similar capacities are engaged in a preemption race to become the
industry leader. The difference in investment activity is greatest in state (5, 5) where both
firms invest 1.90 in the first equilibrium compared to 1.03 in the second one. Investment
activity also differs considerably in states (1, 6) and (6, 1): in the first (second) equilibrium
the smaller firm invests 2.24 (3.92) and the larger firm invests 1.57 (1.46). That is, in the
second equilibrium, the laggard invests heavily in a bid to catch up with the leader, and the
leader to some extent accommodates the laggard. Note that multiplicity in this example
rests on the dynamic nature of the game. Because product market competition takes place
before investment decisions are carried out, a firm has no incentive to invest if β = 0. Hence,
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multiple equilibria cannot possibly arise in the static version of the game.
The computations were performed using a Matlab 5.3 implementation of the Pakes
& McGuire (1994) algorithm. The first equilibrium was computed using a Gauss-Jacobi
scheme to update the value and policy functions, the second using a Gauss-Seidel scheme
(see e.g. Judd 1998). This is worth pointing out because many applications of Ericson
& Pakes’s (1995) framework have searched for multiple equilibria by selecting a single al-
gorithm and varying the starting values. This approach, however, failed to identify the
different equilibria in our example, and its use may thus lead one to falsely conclude that
multiplicity is not an issue.
Example: Entry/exit decisions. In the above example nonuniqueness results solely
from firms’ investment decisions in a model without entry and exit. We next show that
nonuniqueness may also result from firms’ exit decisions. We slightly extend our example
with random scrap values/setup costs from section 3. In particular, suppose that each
firm can now be in one of two “active” states (i.e., M = 2) and that the current profit
in states (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), and (2, 2) is the same. Suppose finally that a firm cannot
transit between its active states (in the above example this corresponds to a situation with
ineffective investment (α = 0) and zero depreciation (δ = 0)).
Again there are two symmetric equilibria. One equilibrium has both firms play the
cutoff exit strategies from section 3 in states (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), and (2, 2) and remain
in the industry with high probability (ξ(1, 1) = ξ(1, 2) = ξ(2, 1) = ξ(2, 2) = 0.8549).
The top panels of Table 7 summarize this equilibrium for ² = 1. Another equilibrium is
illustrated in the bottom panels of Table 7. In states (1, 1) and (2, 2) both firms continue
to play the cutoff exit strategies from section 3 and remain in the industry with high
probability (ξ(1, 1) = ξ(2, 2) = 0.8549). In state (1, 2) firm 1 stays with low probability
(ξ(1, 2) = 0.1542) and firm 2 stays for sure (ξ(2, 1) = 1) whereas in state (2, 1) firm 1 stays
for sure (ξ(2, 1) = 1) and firm 2 stays with low probability (ξ(1, 2) = 0.1542). Note that
this equilibrium is symmetric by construction.
The two equilibria differ starkly from each other: In the first equilibrium, a duopolistic
industry may over time turn into either a monopolistic or an empty industry. In the second
equilibrium, if the industry starts in states (1, 2) or (2, 1), then it always ends up as a
monopoly.
Pakes & McGuire (1994) have previously conjectured that nonuniqueness may result
from firms’ exit decisions, especially in “situations in which one firm out of two (or several
firms out of many) must exit, but either exiting would generate an equilibrium” (p. 570).
To resolve this issue they suggest to assume that firms make exit decisions sequentially in a
given order. The drawback is that ordering firms renders symmetry inapplicable (since we
must now distinguish between firms with the same state according to their order), thereby
increasing the size of the state space and the computational burden. Further, Pakes &
McGuire’s (1994) suggestion may fail to rule out all but one equilibrium. To see this,
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V (ω1, ω2) ω2 = 1 ω2 = 2 ω2 = 3
ω1 = 1 15.7309 15.7309 21
ω1 = 2 15.7309 15.7309 21
ξ(ω1, ω2) ω2 = 1 ω2 = 2 ω2 = 3
ω1 = 1 0.8549 0.8549 1
ω1 = 2 0.8549 0.8549 1
V (ω1, ω2) ω2 = 1 ω2 = 2 ω2 = 3
ω1 = 1 15.7309 15.0238 21
ω1 = 2 19.8279 15.7309 21
ξ(ω1, ω2) ω2 = 1 ω2 = 2 ω2 = 3
ω1 = 1 0.8549 0.1542 1
ω1 = 2 1 0.8549 1
Table 7: Two more equilibria.
consider our example with deterministic scrap values/setup costs from section 3. Suppose
that there is just one “active” state (i.e., M = 1) and that, in each period, firm 1 makes
its exit decision before firm 2. Hence, firm 1 takes into account how its exit decision affects
that of firm 2. It is easy to see that there are two equilibria. One equilibrium has firm 1 stay
in the industry in state (1, 1) and firm 2 exit whereas another equilibrium has firm 1 exit
and firm 2 stay. Intuitively, there is little reason to believe that sequential exit decisions
alleviate the multiplicity problem unless this assumption enables one to apply a backwards
induction argument. But this is not the case in a model with an infinite horizon such as
the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model.
Example: Product market competition. We close this section by noting that we
treat the profit function pin(·) as a primitive. Instead we could have gone back to demand
and cost fundamentals and explicitly modelled competition in the product market. To
the extent that this game admits more than one equilibrium pin(·) fails to be determined
uniquely, thereby making product market competition yet another source of multiplicity.
7 Conclusions
This paper provides a general model of dynamic competition in an oligopolistic industry
with investment, entry, and exit and ensures that there exists a computationally tractable
equilibrium for it. Our starting point is the observation that existence of an equilibrium
in the Ericson & Pakes (1995) game of complete information requires mixed entry/exit
strategies. This is problematic from a computational point of view because the existing
algorithms—notably Pakes & McGuire (1994, 2001)—cannot cope with mixed strategies.
We therefore introduce firm heterogeneity in the form of randomly drawn, privately known
scrap values and setup costs into the model. We show that the resulting game of incomplete
information always has an equilibrium in cutoff entry/exit strategies that is no more de-
manding to compute than a (possibly nonexistent) equilibrium in pure entry/exit strategies
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of the original game of complete information
Since computing mixed strategies over continuous actions is well beyond present com-
putational capabilities, it is vital to ensure existence of an equilibrium in pure investment
strategies in addition to cutoff entry/exit strategies. We achieve this in our proofs by first
assuming that a firm’s investment choice always is uniquely determined. We then show
that this assumption is satisfied provided the transition function is UIC admissible. This,
in fact, is a key contribution because UIC admissibility is defined with respect to the model’s
primitives and is easily checked.
We build on our basic existence result in several ways. We first show that a symmetric
equilibrium exists provided the model’s primitives are symmetric. This is a significant result
for two reasons. First, from a computational viewpoint, symmetry is needed to control
the size of the state space. Second, from a substantive viewpoint, in models of dynamic
competition with entry and exit, there is often no compelling reason why a particular
entrant should be different from any other entrant. This makes a symmetric equilibrium an
especially compelling solution concept because, in such an equilibrium, firm heterogeneity
arises endogenously from the idiosyncratic outcomes that the ex ante identical firms realize
from their investments. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to guarantee existence of
a symmetric equilibrium in a broad class of dynamic stochastic games.29,30 Our argument
is readily extended to arbitrary dynamic stochastic games.
Next we show that, as the distribution of the random scrap values/setup costs becomes
degenerate, equilibria in cutoff entry/exit strategies converge to equilibria in mixed en-
try/exit strategies of the game of complete information. Our argument again extends to
arbitrary dynamic stochastic games with discrete actions. While one suspects that there
are fundamental similarities between the set of Markov perfect equilibria in these games
and the set of Nash equilibria in normal form games, proof is still required and by no means
obvious.31 Indeed, we have been unable to determine whether or not the approachability
part of Harsanyi’s (1973a) purification theorem carries over from static games to dynamic
stochastic games. That is, are all equilibria of the original game approached by some equi-
librium of the perturbed game as the perturbation vanishes? We leave this as an open
question for future research.
29Dutta & Sundaram (1992) show that there exists a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium in two-player
resource extraction games with a one-dimensional state space.
30While Pesendorfer & Schmidt-Dengler (2003) purport to show the existence of a symmetric Markov
perfect equilibrium, their (unproven) corollary 1 is flawed. First, their notion of symmetry is ill-conceived.
In the case of two players, for example, it implies that the per-period payoffs to both players are equal,
pi1(a1, a2, s1, s2) = pi2(a1, a2, s1, s2), irrespective of their actions, a1 and a2, and their states, s1 and s2,
whereas symmetry is properly defined as pi1(a1, a2, s1, s2) = pi2(a2, a1, s2, s1) (see section 4.2). Second, they
place no restrictions on the transition function g(a, s, s′). However, if the actions of different players have
different effects on the future state of the game, then a symmetric equilibrium can hardly be expected to
exist.
31For example, the counterpart to the generic finiteness and oddness of the set of Nash equilibria in normal
form games (Wilson 1971, Harsanyi 1973b) has only recently been established by Haller & Lagunoff (2000)
and Herings & Peeters (2004).
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Finally, we provide the first example of multiple symmetric equilibria in the literature
initiated by Ericson & Pakes (1995). While this formally settles the uniqueness issue, it
is just an initial step. In fact, little is known to date about uniqueness of equilibrium in
dynamic stochastic games. Haller & Lagunoff (2000) show that the number of equilibria
is generically finite and Amir (2002) shows that there exists a unique equilibrium in pure
strategies in finite horizon games that satisfy monotonicity, supermodularity, and dominant-
diagonal conditions. More research along these lines is clearly needed.
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